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ESSAYS
EMBEDDED INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE
CONSTITUTION ABROAD
Sarah H. Cleveland *
This Essay explores the role of "embedded" international law in U.S.
constitutional interpretation, in the context of extraterritorial application of
the Constitution. Traditional U.S. understandings of the Constitution's ap-
plication abroad were informed by nineteenth-century international law prin-
ciples of jurisdiction, which largely limited the authority of a sovereign state
to its geographic territory. Both international law and constitutional law
since have developed significantly away from strictly territorial understand-
ings of governmental authority, however. Modern international law princi-
ples of jurisdiction and state responsibility now recognize that states legiti-
mately may exercise power in a number of extraterritorial contexts, and that
legal obligations may apply to situations abroad over which states exercise
"effective control." International bodies, including the European Court of
Human Rights, have applied the principle of effective control to constrain
state conduct abroad. Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in
Boumediene, however, embedded international norms had produced a bi-
furcated approach to the extraterritorial Constitution. Rules governing the
Constitution's application to U.S. nationals abroad reflected an evolutionary
relationship between international and constitutional norms, evolving
largely in concert with modern international doctrines. The United States,
however, asserted an entrenched approach to the Constitution's extraterrito-
rial application to aliens, that continued to be dictated by antiquated, territo-
rial conceptions of international jurisdiction. In adopting a functional ap-
proach to extraterritoriality in Boumediene, the Supreme Court abandoned
formalistic limits on the Constitution's application based on formal sover-
eignty or citizenship, and returned to an evolutionary framework. Much
work remains to be done in elaborating on the Boumediene test and apply-
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ing it to particular constitutional provisions and contexts. But the Court's
evolutionary approach opened a space for aligning U.S. domestic obligations
more closely to contemporary international legal approaches, the expectations
and obligations of our allies, and the modern realities of the exercise of state
power.
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INTRODUCTION
What is, and what should be, the relationship between international
law and the application of the U.S. Constitution abroad? Much academic
ink has been spilled over the question whether international law should
have a role to play in constitutional interpretation.' Much less attention
has been devoted, however, to the reality that portions of U.S. constitu-
tional doctrine have been influenced by international law over time, and
to the question of what ongoing role international law should play once it
has been "embedded" into constitutional doctrine in some form. By
embedded international law, I mean an international law principle that
has become incorporated into the interpretation of a principle of the
American Constitution. This may occur as a result of constitutional text
that references international law, such as the Article II Treaty Clause, or
through judicial interpretation. It may, but does not necessarily, impli-
cate originalism. The phenomenon arises whenever a constitutional pro-
1. A disproportionate share by this author. See generally Sarah H. Cleveland, Foreign
Authority, American Exceptionalism, and the Dred Scott Case, 82 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 393
(2007) (exploring use of foreign and international authority in Dred Scott); Sarah H.
Cleveland, Our International Constitution, 31 Yale J. Int'l L. 1 (2006) [hereinafter




vision has been informed by international law, regardless of the point in
our nation's chronological history when this occurs. Once an interna-
tional norm has become embedded in constitutional doctrine, what
should the relationship be between the international law rule and consti-
tutional doctrine as both develop over time? This Essay explores that ne-
glected question in the context of extraterritorial application of the
Constitution.
Consider two cases: In March 2007, the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia, in In re Iraq and Afghanistan Detainees
Litigation, dismissed a suit by alien detainees who alleged that they had
been brutally tortured in the custody of U.S. military personnel in Iraq
and Afghanistan.2 Expressing deep sympathy for the plaintiffs, the court
nevertheless rejected their claims under the Fifth and Eighth Amend-
ments on the grounds that "nonresident aliens 'without property or pres-
ence in the United States' have no constitutional rights."3 The court re-
lied centrally on the Supreme Court's 1950 decision in Johnson v.
Eisentrager, which had held that enemy aliens with no connection to U.S.
territory, who had been convicted and detained by U.S. government offi-
cials outside the United States, had no constitutional right to habeas juris-
diction in U.S. courts.4
Three months later, in June 2007, the highest court in the United
Kingdom ruled in R (Al-Skeini and others) v. Secretary of State for Defence5 that
the torture and murder of an alien detainee by British military personnel
in Iraq could violate the European Convention on Human Rights. 6
While noting that the European Convention was "primarily territorial" in
scope,7 the Court nevertheless acknowledged that jurisdiction under the
2. 479 F. Supp. 2d. 85 (D.D.C. 2007), appeal pending, Arkan Mohammed Ali, et al. v.
Rumsfeld, Nos. 07-5178, 07-5185, 07-5186 & 07-5187 (D.C. Cir.).
3. Id. at 101 (quoting Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981, 991 (D.C. Cir. 2007)); cf. El-
Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 313 (4th Cir. 2007) (rejecting constitutional challenge
to extraterritorial rendition of German national based on state secrets privilege).
4. 339 U.S. 763, 785 (1950).
5. [2007] UKHL 26, [2008] 1 A.C. 153 (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K). The United
Kingdom opposed jurisdiction in the administrative court, which nevertheless found
jurisdiction under the European Convention on Human Rights for acts that occurred in a
British military facility in Iraq. R (Al-Skeini and others) v. Sec'y of State for Def. [2004]
EWHC (Admin) 2911, (2005) 2 W.L.R. 1401 (Eng.). On appeal, the Secretary of State
accepted that the abuse of appellant had occurred "within the jurisdiction" of the United
Kingdom for purposes of the European Convention, since the events occurred in a British
detention facility. Al-Skeini, [2007] UKHL 1 61, [2008] 1 A.C. at 197 (Rodger, Lord). The
government nevertheless contested jurisdiction on the grounds that the Human Rights Act
had not implemented the Convention extraterritorially. Al-Skeini, [2008] 1 A.C. at 164
(syllabus). On July 10, 2008, the appellant's family agreed to a £2.83 million settlement
with the Ministry of Defense, which was accompanied by an admission of liability and an
apology. Iraqis to Get E3m in MoD Damages, BBC News, July 10, 2008, at http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/7500204.stm (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
6. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov.
4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
7. Al-Skeini, [2008] 1 A.C. at 164 (syllabus).
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Convention could reach certain extraterritorial conduct by state officials,
and apparently was sufficient to reach the beating and murder of Mr.
Mousa, an alien in a British detention facility in Iraq.8
The parallels between the two cases are striking. Both cases involved
claims by persons traditionally considered enemy aliens (citizens of a na-
tion with which the defendant government was at war). Both cases al-
leged severe abuse at the hands of the government's military personnel.
Both involved alleged harms committed in detention facilities operated
by the defendant governments in a war zone. Yet jurisdiction over the
claims of extraterritorial conduct was found in the United Kingdom and
rejected in the United States.9
One could attempt to explain these differences on the grounds that
the laws under which the claims arose-a treaty in the United Kingdom
and the federal Constitution in the United States-might have distinctive
approaches to geographic scope.1 0 I would argue, however, that interna-
tional law concepts of jurisdiction have shaped the extraterritorial appli-
cations of state obligations under both of these instruments.
The European Convention provides no explicit guidance on its geo-
graphic application, other than to state in Article 1 that States Parties
must afford the protections of the Convention "to everyone within their
jurisdiction."" Both the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human
Rights, which is charged with evaluating state compliance with the
Convention, and the Law Lords in AI-Skeini, have looked to principles of
jurisdiction under public international law in order to inform the scope
of a state's extraterritorial obligations under the Convention.' 2
The U.S. Constitution similarly contains few textual indicators of its
geographic scope, other than occasional provisions that are explicitly lim-
ited to the "States,"' 3 or that expressly refer to the United States's "juris-
8. Id. 6, 1 A.C. at 178 (Bingham, Lord).
9. Notably, the alien status of the claimants (and particularly their enemy alienage),
and the corresponding issues of social compact and membership, played a significant role
in the U.S. litigation and were irrelevant to the U.K case.
10. There were other differences between the cases, particularly with respect to
remedies. The suit in In re Iraq and Afghanistan Detainees Litigation, 479 F. Supp. 2d 85,
88, 91 (D.D.C. 2007), was a suit for damages and declaratory relief under the Constitution
and the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006), while the Al-Skeini claimants sought a
declaration and "a full, open, independent [public] inquiry." Al-Skeini, [2007] UKHL 1
26, [2008] 1 A.C. at 188 (Bingham, Lord). Apparently, however, a suit for damages in tort
was also available to the litigants under English law. Id. 35, 1 A.C. at 190 (Rodger, Lord).
11. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
supra note 6, at 224.
12. See infra Parts IV.D.1 (analyzing views of European Court of Human Rights on
extraterritorial application of human rights), IV.D.2 (discussing Al-Sheini and Law Lords'
views on extraterritorial application of human rights).
13. E.g., U.S. Const. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (defining representative voting structure in
Congress); id. art. II, § 1, cl. 2 (defining voting structure in electoral college); id. art. IV,
§ 4 (guaranteeing a "republican form of government" to every state). The Uniformity
228 [Vol. 110:225
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diction."1 4 The Fifth and Eighth Amendment provisions at issue in In re
Iraq and Afghanistan Detainees Litigation contain no explicit geographic
limitation (and facially apply to "persons," not to citizens)"15 Determin-
ing the application of the Constitution to extraterritorial activities of state
authorities accordingly has been largely left to judicial interpretation,
and international rules regarding the jurisdiction of sovereign states have
played an important role.
Traditional doctrines regarding the geographic scope of U.S. consti-
tutional protections derive from nineteenth-century international law
principles ofjurisdiction, which largely limited the lawful jurisdiction of a
sovereign state to its geographic territory. The strict territorial limitations
on international jurisdiction were overstated at the time, however, and
have long since been abandoned. 6 Instead, international law now recog-
nizes that states may legitimately exercise power in a number of extrater-
ritorial contexts, and also imposes legal responsibility on states for their
actions abroad. Regional human rights tribunals, the U.N. treaty bodies,
and the International Court of Justice (ICJ) all have recognized that
human rights obligations travel with a state when a state or its agents
place persons or territories under the state's "effective control."1 7 De-
spite this evolution in international law doctrine, in the aftermath of
September 11, 2001, the United States government continued to main-
tain that aliens detained by the United States outside of U.S. sovereign
territory were not entitled to constitutional protection-a position which
was embraced by the district court in In re Iraq and Afghanistan Detainees
Litigation.1 8
Enter the Supreme Court's 2008 decisions in Boumediene v. Bush'9
and Munaf v. Geren.20 In Boumediene, the Court held that the Suspension
Clause applied to alien detainees at Guantinamo Bay due to the practical
Clause is limited to the "United States." Id. art. I, § 8, cl. I ("[A]ll Duties, Imposts and
Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States.").
14. Id. amend. XIII (stating slavery and involuntary servitude shall not exist "within
the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction"); id. amend. XIV, § 1
(recognizing citizenship for "[a]ll persons born or naturalized in the United States, and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof"); id. amend. XVIII, § 1 (prohibiting "manufacture, sale,
or transportation of intoxicating liquors within . . . the United States and all territory
subject to the jurisdiction thereof").
15. Id. amend. V ("No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law . . . ."); id. amend. VIII (prohibiting infliction of "cruel and
unusual punishments").
16. It is arguable that eighteenth-century standards were quite different. See Philip
Hamburger, Beyond Protection, 109 Colum. L. Rev. 1823 (2009). This is not the occasion
to examine how much of the earlier conceptions so excellently laid out by Philip
Hamburger have survived.
17. See infra Part IV (discussing international bodies' treatment of obligations flowing
from effective control).
18. 479 F. Supp. 2d. 85, 109 (D.D.C. 2007).
19. 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008).
20. 128 S. Ct. 2207 (2008).
20101 229
COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW
features of United States authority over the base.2 1 The Supreme Court
did not rely on formal attributes of sovereignty or territory, but instead
applied a pragmatic, functional test to the question.2 2 The Supreme
Court accordingly brought U.S. extraterritoriality doctrine substantially
in line with modern international law principles of jurisdiction and state
responsibility. Munaf was a statutory habeas case, involving the access of
U.S. citizens detained in Iraq to habeas review in the U.S. courts.2 3 But
that decision also applied a functional analysis of the nature of U.S. con-
trol to determine the applicability of extraterritorial limits on U.S.
power.2 4
This Essay takes the Boumediene and Munaf decisions as an opportu-
nity to explore the dynamic relationship between international law and
extraterritorial application of the Constitution. Part I sets forth the con-
temporary international rules of extraterritorial jurisdiction, including
classical rules regarding the ability of states to lawfully regulate conduct
abroad, as well as broader concepts ofjurisdiction as an exercise of power
or sovereignty (whether lawful or unlawful) and the related concept of
state responsibility for extraterritorial conduct.
Part II demonstrates that our contemporary doctrines regarding the
Constitution's extraterritorial scope are informed by embedded interna-
tional law norms. I argue that prior to the decision in Boumediene, these
embedded international norms had produced a bifurcated approach to
the extraterritorial Constitution. Rules governing the Constitution's ap-
plication to U.S. nationals abroad had evolved in concert with modern
international conceptions ofjurisdiction and state responsibility, while, at
least in the view of the U.S. government and some lower courts, rules
regarding application of the Constitution to aliens remained tied to for-
malistic, antiquated nineteenth-century territorial conceptions of
jurisdiction.
Part III examines the appropriate role of embedded international
norms as constitutional and international law evolve and identifies three
potential approaches to embedded international norms, which I call evo-
lutionary, entrenchment, and substitution approaches. I argue that pre-
Boumediene extraterritoriality doctrine had been characterized by an evo-
lutionary approach for citizens and an entrenchment approach for aliens.
Part IV then returns to the modern international law conception of
jurisdiction as control, under which international and regional bodies
have held that rights apply to extraterritorial conduct over persons or
21. 128 S. Ct. at 2259-62,
22. Id. at 2259; see discussion infra notes 224-232.
23. Munaf, 128 S. Ct. at 2213 (noting case "concern[s] the availability of habeas
corpus relief arising from the .. . detention of American citizens who voluntarily traveled
to Iraq and are alleged to have committed crimes there").
24. See id. at 2217 ("[A]ctual custody by the United States suffices for jurisdiction,
even if that custody could be viewed as 'under . . . color of' another authority .
(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (c)(1) (2006))).
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places that occurs within a state's "effective control." I explore the elabo-
ration of this principle in the jursidprudence of the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights, the International Court of Justice, the
European Court of Human Rights, and the U.N. treaty bodies that have
most extensively considered this issue-namely, the Human Rights Com-
mittee and the Committee Against Torture.
Part V applies the three approaches to embedded international
norms identified in Part III to the Supreme Court's decisions in
Boumediene and Munaf Although the full implications of these decisions
are presently unclear, I argue that the decisions collectively created a
space for bringing U.S. doctrine in line with contemporary international
approaches to extraterritorial jurisdiction. They thus can be understood
as reasserting an evolutionary relationship between the extraterritorial
Constitution and international law.
Part VI demonstrates that our contemporary doctrines regarding the
Constitution's extraterritorial scope are informed by embedded interna-
tional law norms. I argue that prior to the decision in Boumediene, these
embedded international norms had produced a bifurcated approach to
the extraterritorial Constitution. Rules governing the Constitution's ap-
plication to U.S. nationals abroad had evolved in concert with modern
international conceptions ofjurisdiction and state responsibility, while, at
least in the view of the U.S. government and some lower courts, rules
regarding application of the Constitution to aliens remained tied to for-
malistic, antiquated nineteenth-century territorial conceptions of
jurisdiction.
This Essay concludes by offering preliminary observations regarding
the implications of an effective control test for extraterritorial application
of the Constitution. While the concept of effective control itself contin-
ues to be elaborated, effective control offers a promising standard for
understanding constitutional extraterritoriality that is both workable and
comports with the expectations of U.S. allies, U.S. responsibility under
international law, and the modern realities of the exercise of state power
abroad.
I. THE INTERNATIONAL LAw oF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is a multifaceted concept, with many different meanings
under both international and domestic law.25 International law com-
monly employs the term 'jurisdiction" to refer to the ability of a state to
lawfully exercise its domestic authority over persons or property.26 Inter-
25. As Justice Scalia has observed, "Jurisdiction ... is a word of many, too many,
meanings." Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 90 (1998) (quoting United
States v. Vanness, 85 F.3d 661, 663 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1996)).
26. See Antonio Cassese, International Law 49 (2d ed. 2005) ("The power of the
central authorities of a State to exercise public functions over individuals located in a
territory is called 'jurisdiction.'"); 1 Oppenheim's International Law §§ 136-137 (Robert
Jennings & Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed. 1992) (describing jurisdiction as concerning "extent
2010] 231
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national law further breaks down the ability to exercise authority into
three related categories: jurisdiction to prescribe, jurisdiction to enforce,
and jurisdiction to adjudicate. Jurisdiction to prescribe, or prescriptive
jurisdiction, refers to the authority of the lawmaking arm of the state to
make, or prescribe, legal rules applicable in a particular context. Jurisdic-
tion to enforce refers to the authority of the state to enforce the rules that
it has made. Finally, jurisdiction to adjudicate refers to the power of a
court to lawfully exercise its authority over a person or property to resolve
a legal dispute. These forms of jurisdiction, although integrally related,
vary in important respects. For example, a state may lawfully exercise its
prescriptive jurisdiction to regulate extraterritorial conduct in certain
contexts (such as when the extraterritorial conduct has sufficient effects
within the state's territory), and may do so without another state's con-
sent. But a state may not exercise its enforcement jurisdiction in the ter-
ritory of another state without that state's consent.
States presumptively enjoy prescriptive jurisdiction within their own
territory. This is not invariably the case, however, as international law
recognizes that states lack such jurisdiction over diplomats of another
state who are within their territory.2 7 Modern international law also rec-
ognizes that states may lawfully exercise prescriptive jurisdiction outside
their sovereign borders in a number of contexts: over persons in their
territorial waters; over vessels and aircraft bearing the state's flag; over the
state's own nationals abroad; over persons who have directly harmed the
state's nationals abroad; over persons seeking to harm the state's vital in-
terests, where an action abroad has effects within the jurisdiction; and
over persons whose conduct violates principles of universal concern, such
as piracy or genocide.2 8 These concepts of prescriptive jurisdiction, how-
ever, as well as the related jurisdictions to enforce and to adjudicate, ad-
dress contexts in which international law recognizes that a state may law-
fully exercise authority extraterritorially. They do not address the
circumstances in which a state may be held legally responsible for its ac-
tions abroad, regardless of whether the exercise of extraterritorial power
was lawful or unlawful. Instead these are concepts that address jurisdic-
tion as legal authority.
As discussed in more detail in Part IV, infra, international law also
conceptualizes the 'jurisdiction" of a state more broadly to refer simply to
the de facto exercise of power, regardless of whether that exercise is law-
ful. In this sense, jurisdiction refers to an exercise of the state's sover-
of each state's right to regulate conduct," including "over persons, property or
circumstances . .. abroad").
27. Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 464
(1987) (stating diplomats are immune "from the exercise by the receiving state of
jurisdiction to prescribe in respect of acts or omissions in the exercise of the agent's official
functions, as well as from other regulation that would be incompatible with the agent's
diplomatic status").
28. Id. § 402 & cmts. d-h (recognizing jurisdiction to prescribe on these grounds).
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eignty.29 Jurisdiction as power or control addresses not whether a state
acted lawfully, but whether the state, in fact, exercised its power in a man-
ner that could give rise to state responsibility under international law.
Jurisdiction as control addresses a pragmatic, fact-based question regard-
ing whether the state exercised its authority, not the legal question of
whether the state did so validly.
Some modern commentators have maintained that it is jurisdiction
as control that is referenced when modem human rights treaties discuss
the jurisdictional scope of treaty obligations.3 0 Most questions of extra-
territorial application of human rights protections addressed in Part IV,
however, would also be encompassed by the classical prescriptive jurisdic-
tion principle that a state may regulate the conduct of its own agents
abroad.
The concept of jurisdiction in international human rights treaties is
closely linked to the international law concept of state responsibility,
since it is the exercise of jurisdiction that gives rise to legal obligations
under the treaties.31 In addressing whether the United States was legally
responsible under international law for harms committed by the
U.S.-supported Nicaraguan contras, the ICJ concluded that state responsi-
bility for acts directly committed by third parties may arise in two ways:
where a state exercises sufficient "overall control" over a nonstate group
for the group to be considered a de facto organ of the state (even if the
state did not control any specific operation of the group), or where the
state controls a specific operation by a group that otherwise is not suffi-
29. Sovereignty, of course, is itself a slippery concept. See generally Louis Henkin,
That "S" Word: Sovereignty, and Globalization, and Human Rights, et cetera, 68 Fordham
L. Rev. 1 (1999) (examining the many meanings of sovereignty).
30. See Marko Milanovi, From Compromise to Principle: Clarifying the Concept of
State Jurisdiction in Human Rights Treaties, 8 Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 411, 429 (2008) (noting
"classical doctrine ofjurisdiction" over "the conduct of persons" and notion ofjurisdiction
as "power that a state exercises over a territory and its inhabitants ... may be related, but
they cannot possibly be the same"); see also Olivier De Schutter, Globalization and
jurisdiction: Lessons from the European Convention on Human Rights, 6 Baltic Y.B. Int'l
L. 185, 190-93 (2006) ("[T]he fact that States may affect situations beyond their national
borders, by adopting acts which are clearly attributable to them in the meaning of ... the
ILC's Articles on State Responsibility, raises a question of the relationship between the
notion of 'jurisdiction' and the notion of national territory."); Ralph Wilde, Triggering
State Obligations Extraterritorially: The Spatial Test in Certain Human Rights Treaties, 40
Isr. L. Rev. 503, 513-14 (2007) (discussing jurisdiction and extraterritorial applicability of
human rights obligations).
31. According to the International Law Commission's Articles on State Responsibility,
a state incurs legal responsibility under international law where the act "(a) is attributable
to the State under international law; and (b) constitutes a breach of an international
obligation of the State." Int'l Law Comm'n, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for
Internationally Wrongful Acts, art. 2, in Report of the International Law Commission:




ciently linked to the state to be considered an arm of the state.3 2 The ICJ
reiterated these "complete dependence" and "direction or control" bases
for state responsibility in its 2007 Genocide judgment.33 The ICJ also has
recognized that a state's exercise of de facto control over a territory gives
rise to legal liability under international law. Thus, in the 1971 Namibia
judgment, the court held that " [p] hysical control of a territory, and not
sovereignty or legitimacy of title, is the basis of State liability for acts af-
fecting other States."3 4
Modern international law also recognizes the validity of extraterrito-
rial state conduct in other contexts, such as in the law of armed conflict,
which allows a state to utilize force against another state in self-defense,
and to exercise legal authority over a territory that is under its military
occupation.3 5 The developing concept of responsibility to protect also
seeks to establish an obligation on the international community to inter-
vene to prevent mass atrocities occurring on the soil of another state.3 6
International law, in short, recognizes a substantial range of state conduct
outside of a state's borders and establishes principles for determining
both when such conduct is legitimate and when it exposes the state to
legal liability.
II. THE NINETEENTH CENTURY: JURISDICTION AS GEOGRAPHY
Prevailing nineteenth-century international law principles estab-
lished that a nation's legal jurisdiction to regulate conduct was cotermi-
nous with its territory.37 Principles of comity and rules of international
32. See Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.CJ. 14, 62 (June 27)
("[T]here is no clear evidence of the United States having actually exercised such a degree
of control in all fields as to justify treating the contras as acting on its behalf."); id at 65
("For this conduct to give rise to legal responsibility of the United States, it would in
principle have to be proved that the State had effective control of the military or
paramilitary operations in the course of which the alleged violations were committed.").
33. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Mont.) (Order of Feb. 26, 2007) at 140, 142, available
at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/91/13685.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law
Review).
34. Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in
Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970),
Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. 16, 54 (June 21). The court's jurisprudence regarding
jurisdiction under human rights treaties is examined infra Part IV.
35. See, e.g., Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in
Time of War, art. 64, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Fourth
Geneva Convention] (providing occupying power with authority to "subject the population
of the occupied territory to [penal] provisions which are essential to enable the Occupying
Power to fulfil its obligations . . . to maintain the orderly government of the territory").
36. See generally Int'l Comm'n on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The
Responsibility to Protect (2001).
37. Henry Wheaton, Elements of International Law § 78 (Richard Henry Dana, Jr.
ed., Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1866) ("[N]o State can, by its laws, directly affect, bind, or
regulate property beyond its own territory, or control persons who do not reside within it,
whether they be native-born subjects or not.").
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law in the Westphalian system directed states to respect the sovereign ju-
risdiction of others and to avoid jurisdictional conflicts. The lawful juris-
diction of the state accordingly was territorially limited. Chief Justice
Marshall famously articulated the principle in The Schooner Exchange, not-
ing "[t] he jurisdiction of courts is a branch of that which is possessed by
the nation as an independent sovereign power. The jurisdiction of the
nation within its own territory is necessarily exclusive and absolute."
38
Marshall then elaborated: "This full and absolute territorial jurisdiction
being alike the attribute of every sovereign, and being incapable of con-
ferring extra-territorial power, would not seem to contemplate foreign
sovereigns nor their sovereign rights as its objects." 3 9
While ChiefJustice Marshall was referring to all aspects of the lawful
jurisdiction of a state, explicit reference to international law in the con-
text of jurisdiction to adjudicate can be found in Pennoyer v. Neff,
40 in
which the Court invoked public international law rules to limit the per-
sonal jurisdiction of the U.S. state courts to persons within their respec-
tive territories. Recognizing that the U.S. states maintained many charac-
teristics of independent sovereigns, Justice Field began his analysis by
applying
two well-established principles of public law respecting the juris-
diction of an independent State over persons and property....
One of these principles is, that every State possesses exclusive
jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and property within its
territory. ... The other principle . . . is, that no State can exer-
cise direct jurisdiction and authority over persons or property
without its territory. The several States are of equal dignity and
authority, and the independence of one implies the exclusion of
power from all others. And so it is laid down by jurists . . . that
the laws of one State have no operation outside of its territory,
except so far as is allowed by comity; and that no tribunal estab-
lished by it can extend its process beyond that territory so as to
subject either persons or property to its decisions.
4 1
This rule, he concluded, precluded the exercise of jurisdiction to
adjudicate over a defendant absent personal service of process or volun-
tary appearance within the territory.4 2  Although the Fourteenth
Amendment had not yet gone into effect at the time the claim arose,
Justice Field read the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause as in-
corporating this jurisdictional principle.4 3
This rigid limitation of a state's lawful jurisdiction to its sovereign
territory, however, overstated the international rule even at the time. In
The Schooner Exchange, Chief Justice Marshall recognized that the princi-
38. The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136 (1812).
39. Id. at 137.
40. 95 U.S. 714 (1877), overruled in part by Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
41. Id. at 722 (citations omitted).




ple of strict territoriality did not absolutely prohibit the exercise of au-
thority in foreign territory. To the contrary, "all sovereigns [had] con-
sented to a relaxation in practice, in cases under certain peculiar
circumstances." 4 4 Likewise, the principle of absolute territorial sover-
eignty had begun to erode even before Pennoyer was decided, as commen-
tators have noted.45 Courts also increasingly recognized the constitu-
tional power of the government to act abroad.4 6 But the Westphalian
conception of the equality and mutual respect owed to territorial states
was the prevailing conception of the day.
Indeed, in the nineteenth century, international law was still unset-
tled regarding whether a state could exercise jurisdiction over its own
citizens abroad. Writing in the 1830s, Wheaton believed that states could
not exercise such jurisdiction.4 7 In 1909, Justice Holmes held that U.S.
statutes lacked effect in the territory of another sovereign, but he ac-
knowledged that, "in regions subject to no sovereign, like the high seas,
or to no law that civilized countries would recognize as adequate, such
countries may treat some relations between their citizens as governed by
their own law, and keep, to some extent, the old notion of personal sover-
44. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 136; see also Wheaton, supra note 37, §§ 79, 111 (discussing
exceptions to territorial limits on jurisdiction).
45. See Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 611 (1990) (plurality opinion)
("Recent scholarship has suggested that English tradition [regarding territoritial
jurisdiction] was not as clear. . . ."); Albert A. Ehrenzweig, The Transient Rule of Personal
Jurisdiction: The "Power" Myth and Forum Conveniens, 65 Yale L.J. 289, 308 (1956)
("[T]he law concerning the sufficiency and the necessity of personal service within the
state in personal actions . . . remained unsettled at least until . . . Pennoyer v. Neff.");
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., A General Theory of State-Court Jurisdiction, 1965 Sup. Ct. Rev.
241, 255 (noting of English law pre-Pennoyer "[t)he defendant's presence in England seems
to have been less a reason for asserting jurisdiction than an obviation of a reason why it
should not be asserted; it could hardly be said that personal presence was the basis for
jurisdiction"); Friedrich K Juenger, A Shoe Unfit for Globetrotting, 28 U.C. Davis L. Rev.
1027, 1029 (1995) (noting "long before Justice Field decided Pennoyer, the English ... had
already given up on requiring service in the forum"). For a critique of Pennoyer's reliance
on international conflict of law rules, see Martin H. Redish, Due Process, Federalism, and
Personal Jurisdiction: A Theoretical Evaluation, 75 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1112, 1115-16 (1981)
(noting "Pennoyer's rigid principles" did not come from "our English heritage of due
process, but rather the international sovereignty theories of French and Dutch scholars");
see also Jay Conison, What Does Due Process Have to Do with Jurisdiction?, 46 Rutgers L.
Rev. 1071, 1130-35 (1994) (tracing evolution of nineteenth century conflicts doctrine
leading to Pennoyer).
46. See In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453, 475, 479 (1891) (upholding establishment of
overseas consular courts pursuant to treaty power); Jones v. United States, 137 U.S. 202,
212-13, 224 (1890) (invoking international authorities to hold that United States could
adopt criminal legislation for overseas possessions).
47. Wheaton, supra note 37, § 78.
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eignty alive."4 8 English courts in the late nineteenth century recognized
the power to regulate citizens' conduct abroad in some contexts.4 9
During this period, the international law principle of strict territorial
jurisdiction was read into the Constitution's individual rights clauses to
aggressively limit their application to persons (whether citizens or nonci-
tizens) subject to U.S. power abroad. The 1891 case of In re Ross upheld
the conviction of a seaman for murder on a U.S. vessel by a U.S. consular
court in Japan.5 0 Justice Field, who also authored the opinion in Pennoyer
v. Neff, again turned in part to principles of territorial jurisdiction to deny
the constitutional rights to a grand and petit jury.
By the Constitution a government is ordained and established
"for the United States of America," and not for countries outside
of their limits. The guaranties it affords against accusation of
capital or infamous crimes, except by indictment or present-
ment by a grand jury, and for an impartial trial by a jury when
thus accused, apply only to citizens and others within the United
States, or who are brought there for trial for alleged offenses
committed elsewhere, and not to residents or temporary so-
journers abroad. The Constitution can have no operation in an-
other country. When, therefore, the representatives or officers
of our government are permitted to exercise authority of any
kind in another country, it must be on such conditions as the
two countries may agree, the laws of neither one being obliga-
tory upon the other.5 1
Field's invocation of territorial jurisdiction to limit the Constitution's
application in this case, however, was problematic. True, nothing in in-
ternational principles ofjurisdiction allowed the United States to impose
its own constitutional requirements on Japan or Japanese subjects, but
this was not the question presented. Nor was the question whether a U.S.
court could exercise jurisdiction over the defendant at all (as was the
question in Pennoyer). Instead, the question at issue was whether, once
the United States chose to exercise its authority abroad, it was required to
do so consistent with constitutional constraints. Field thus applied ajuris-
dictional principle that was intended to address whether the United
States could lawfully act overseas at all, to prevent the United States, when
48. Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 355-56 (1909); see also The
Hamilton, 207 U.S. 398, 403 (1907) (asserting U.S. state's laws apply to its own citizens on
high seas).
49. British S. Mr. Co. v. Companhia de Mogambique, [1893] A.C. 602, 624 (H.L.)
(appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.) (asserting English court could inquire into overseas title
and award damages for any trespass committed); Hart v. Gumpach, [1872] 4 L.R.-P.C. 439,
463-64 (appeal taken from P.R.C. & Japan) (UK) (granting English courts jurisdiction to
try actions for libel and other personal wrongs brought against British citizens living in
China in service of Emperor of China).
50. 140 U.S. at 453.
51. Id. at 464 (citation omitted).
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it chose to act abroad, from being constrained by the Constitution.5 2 The
invocation of jurisdictional constraints, judged from a modem interna-
tional law perspective, was problematic for an additional reason. The fact
that the defendant was enlisted on a U.S.-flagged vessel and was assimi-
lated to the status of a U.S. citizen established valid grounds for the
United States to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction over him, as Field
largely acknowledged.
Importantly for the holding in Boumediene, Field also asserted that
granting the constitutional protection of a grand and petit jury would be
"impracticable" due to "the impossibility of obtaining a competent" jury
in Japan.53 "The requirement of such a body to accuse and to try an
offender would, in a majority of cases, cause an abandonment of all
prosecution." 54
Decisions following the Spanish-American War modified the princi-
ple in In re Ross and applied it to occupied or newly acquired territories
fully under U.S. control. Neely v. Henkel held that constitutional protec-
tions could not apply to the trial of a U.S. citizen by the U.S. military in
U.S.-occupied Cuba for violations of Cuban law.5 5 Disregarding the cur-
rent state of de facto U.S. authority over CubaJustice Harlan rejected the
constitutional claims on the grounds that "those provisions have no rela-
tion to crimes committed without the jurisdiction of the United States
against the laws of a foreign country."5 6 "When an American citizen com-
mits a crime in a foreign country," Harlan reasoned, "he cannot com-
plain if required to submit to such modes of trial and to such punishment
as the laws of that country may prescribe for its own people."5 7 The
Court's ruling, which was reaffirmed in Munaf, thus rested on the fiction
that Neely was being tried by a foreign state, since the United States only
claimed a "temporary occupancy and control of Cuba."5 8 The Court ig-
nored the facts that Cuba was subject to exclusive U.S. authority and that
the trial would be conducted by the U.S. military.
In deference to the Court, however, Justice Harlan may have been
concerned about another aspect of international law that complicates the
application of either the Constitution or human rights law to a zone of
military occupation. Longstanding rules of armed conflict obligate an
52. See Gerald L. Neuman, Strangers to the Constitution: Immigrants, Borders, and
Fundamental Law 82-83 (1996) [hereinafter, Neuman, Strangers to the Constitution]
(analyzing "slippery" logic of Field's opinion).
53. In re Ross, 140 U.S. at 464.
54. Id. This aspect of the holding was abandoned in Reid v. Covert, which held that
Fifth and Sixth Amendment protections applied to the peacetime capital trials of U.S.
civilians abroad. 354 U.S. 1, 7-9 (1957); see infra text accompanying notes 68-70.
55. 180 U.S. 109, 122-23 (1901); see also Fleming v. Page, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 603, 611
(1850) (holding that territory under U.S. military occupation was not subject to U.S.
statutes until Congress extended them there).
56. Neely, 180 U.S. at 122.
57. Id. at 123.
58. Id. at 120-21.
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occupying state to preserve the local municipal laws, to the extent possi-
ble.5 9 As the Court noted elsewhere in the opinion, the treaty with Spain
transferring Cuba to U.S. authority provided that the United States "as-
sume and discharge the obligations that may, under international law,
result from the fact of its occupation for the protection of life and prop-
erty."6 0 The Court may have plausibly assumed that if, in fact, the U.S.
occupation was to be temporary, then the effort to impose unfamiliar
U.S. constitutional criminal trial procedures on a civil legal system would
have been unworkable.
Territoriality principles were sufficiently powerful to lead the Court
to hold in the Insular Cases that nonfundamental constitutional provi-
sions would not apply even on territories over which the United States
claimed full sovereignty, even to U.S. citizens. Unlike Neely, which ad-
dressed the temporary occupation of Cuba, the territories at issue in the
Insular Cases (including Puerto Rico, the Philippines, Alaska, and Hawaii)
were subject to formal U.S. sovereignty. Nevertheless, territoriality princi-
ples had become sufficiently embedded in extraterritoriality doctrine that
even sovereign U.S. territories were found not fully subject to the
Constitution.
The most prominent of these cases, Downes v. Bidwell, looked to in-
ternational rules of conquest to hold that acquiring territory by treaty
necessarily brought the power to "prescribe upon what terms the United
States will receive its inhabitants, and what their status shall be."6 1 The
Court thus held that the United States's acquisition of territory by treaty
brought powers of colonial governance recognized under international
law that were only minimally constrained by the Constitution, unless and
until Congress "incorporated" such territories into the United States.6 2
59. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 35, art. 64 ("The penal laws of the
occupied territory shall remain in force . . .
60. 180 U.S. at 121.
61. 182 U.S. 244, 279 (1901).
62. Id. at 279-80; see also Fleming v. Page, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 603, 617-18 (1850)
("[T]he laws of nations . . . [determine] the rights which a sovereign acquires, and the
powers he may exercise in a conquered country . . . ."). International law principles of
jurisdiction have also been employed in other constitutional contexts. See, e.g., Burnet v.
Brooks, 288 U.S. 378, 387-88, 406 (1933) (applying "the principles of jurisdiction
recognized in international relations" to reject Fifth Amendment due process challenge to
taxation of U.S. estate of foreign national); Cunard S.S. Co. v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 100,
122-24 (1923) (construing Eighteenth Amendment's application to "all territory subject
to" U.S. jurisdiction in light of international law principles of territorial jurisdiction); see
also United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 666-67 (1898) (construing application
of Fourteenth Amendment's natural born citizenship clause to persons born "subject to
the jurisdiction" of United States in light of international law); Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94,
102 (1884) (holding Indians "are no more 'born in the United States and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof,' within the meaning of the . . . fourteenth amendment, than . . . the
children born within the United States, of ambassadors or other public ministers of foreign
nations"). Territorial principles also appear in cases defining U.S. international
boundaries, vertical federalism cases including the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction
and the Eleventh Amendment, and horizontal federalism cases construing the Full Faith
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The Court's ultimate solution was to infuse the Constitution with powers
deduced from international law, mediated by some limited constitutional
protections.
The nineteenth- and early twentieth-century decisions addressing ap-
plication of constitutional rights abroad thus both relied upon the inter-
national principle of territorial jurisdiction, and misapplied it. The con-
clusion that constitutional provisions would not apply abroad was
consistent with a territorial conception that a nation's municipal law did
not apply outside its borders. But this principle was not applied to the
question whether the United States could exercise its legal authority
abroad. All of the cases addressed situations in which the United States
was already exerting power abroad. The principle of territorial jurisdic-
tion was applied, not to address whether the United States had authority
to act, but to hold that constitutional limitations should not confine that
action. Once U.S. jurisdiction to prescribe was established, however,
nothing in international jurisdictional principles prevented domestic
constitutional constraints from also applying. Nevertheless, this mis-
placed application of territorial jurisdiction became deeply embedded in
extraterritoriality doctrine.
Juxtaposed with these cases holding that constitutional provisions
were largely unavailing to citizens or noncitizens outside the territorial
United States is the 1886 decision in Yick Wo v. Hopkins, which affirmed
that Fourteenth Amendment due process and equal protection applied
universally "to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction," including
noncitizens. 63 The reference to territory was a throwaway-the case in-
volved only the rights of aliens in the United States. No question regard-
ing the geographic scope of these protections was raised in the briefs or
the opinion. 64 The statement nevertheless gained potency in future
cases, by negative implication, when it was invoked to demonstrate that
constitutional protections did not reach aliens outside the United States.
Johnson v. Eisentrager, the Cold War opinion holding that convicted
enemy aliens outside sovereign United States territory lacked constitu-
tional habeas protections, accordingly found a strong negative pregnant
in the language of Yick Wo:
[I]n extending constitutional protections beyond the citizenry,
the Court has been at pains to point out that it was the alien's
presence within its territorial jurisdiction that gave the Judiciary
power to act. In the pioneer case of Yick Wo v. Hopkins, the
Court said of the Fourteenth Amendment, "[t]hese provisions
are universal in their application, to all persons within the territorial
and Credit Clause. See generally Cleveland, International Constitution, supra note 1, at
51-63 (discussing cases).
63. 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886).
64. The Court also cited with approval an earlier decision that had upheld the
constitutional claims of an alien who had not yet entered the United States. Id. at 374
(citing Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275 (1875)).
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jurisdiction . . . ." And in The Japanese Immigrant Case, the Court
held its processes available to "an alien, who has entered the
country, and has become subject in all respects to its
jurisdiction ... ."65
Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez
relied on Yick Wo and Eisentrager for the same proposition.6 6
In the twentieth century, the expansion of U.S. interests abroad be-
gan eroding the principle against extraterritorial application of the
Constitution, at least for U.S. nationals. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Ex-
port Corp. suggested that "[n]either the Constitution nor the laws passed
in pursuance of it have any force in foreign territory unless in respect of our
own citizens."67 The doctrine of strict territoriality was finally laid to rest,
at least for U.S. citizens abroad, in Reid v. Covert.6 8 The Reid Court dis-
tanced itself from the nineteenth-century doctrines to hold that the con-
stitutional rights to grand and petit jury protected civilian citizens tried
for capital crimes on U.S. military bases overseas. The Court did not for-
mally overturn In re Ross, nor did it explicitly rely on developments in
international law in reaching this conclusion. Instead, the various opin-
ions for the majority relied primarily on endogenous constitutional con-
siderations-either that basic principles of limited and delegated powers
required that the Constitution apply to protect citizens subject to U.S.
custody abroad, as Justice Black's plurality opinion held,6 9 or that extra-
territorial application of constitutional protections was not "impracticable
and anomalous" in circumstances where the United States was fully in
control, and where citizens were facing capital charges, as Justices Harlan
and Frankfurter held in concurrence.7 0 Lower federal courts have since
recognized the Constitution's application in circumstances where the
United States exercises complete jurisdiction and control, even where the
United States does not enjoy full territorial sovereignty.7 1 In United States
v. Tiede, the court applied this principle to the United States's criminal
trial of foreign nationals in American-occupied Berlin, but did so in reli-
ance on internal constitutional principles of limited government, rather
than on rules of international jurisdiction.7 2
Modern constitutional doctrine also has abandoned a strictly territo-
rial approach to jurisdiction in other contexts. Personal jurisdiction
65. 339 U.S. 763, 771 (1950) (citation omitted).
66. 494 U.S. 259, 271-73 (1990).
67. 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936) (emphasis added).
68. 354 U.S. 1, 7-9 (1957); see also Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S.
234, 236-37, 249 (1960) (extending right to constitutional protection in Reid to noncapital
trials).
69. Reid, 354 U.S. at 5-7.
70. Id. at 74-75 (Harlan, J., concurring in the result).
71. Gerald L. Neuman, Closing the Guantanamo Loophole, 50 Loy. L. Rev. 1, 15-34
(2004) (discussing application of constitutional rights to Panama Canal Zone, Pacific Trust
Territories, and U.S. Sector in Berlin, among others).
72. 86 F.R.D. 227, 239 (U.S. Ct. Berlin 1979).
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under Fourteenth Amendment due process no longer restricts a state's
jurisdiction to adjudicate claims involving defendants within its territory,
but recognizes jurisdiction based on "effects" within a state's territory73 or
other forms of minimum contacts, while also considering questions of
reasonableness. 74 The Court has explicitly recognized due process pro-
tections for alien corporations overseas in this context.7 5 The evolution
away from strict territoriality was inspired by the same concerns that gave
rise to modern international law conceptions of jurisdiction-increased
travel of persons and goods across borders and the rise of modern forms
of transportation and communication.7 6 But here again, although the
international and domestic doctrines have evolved in parallel, the Court
has not explicitly linked the evolution in personal jurisdiction doctrine to
changes in international conceptions of jurisdiction. The Court instead
appears to be unconscious of the international law roots of the doctrine.
Prior to Boumediene, however, the abandonment of strict territoriality
principles for aliens abroad was less complete. Eisentrager, which pre-
dated Reid v. Covert by nearly two decades, had rejected the application of
constitutional habeas to alien enemy belligerents with no connection to
the United States who had been convicted in military tribunals and de-
tained abroad.7 7 Despite the absence of jurisdiction, the Court had also
offered sweeping language regarding the absence of Fifth Amendment
protections for aliens abroad.7 8 The dissenters condemned this language
73. Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789 (1984) (citing World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.
Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297-98 (1980)).
74. The now latent international law concept of territorial sovereignty nevertheless
retains some potent force in the purposeful availment prong of contemporary personal
jurisdiction doctrine. See, e.g., World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297 (noting defendant
that "purposefully avail[ed] itself of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum
State" had clear notice that it was subject to suit there (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357
U.S. 235, 253 (1958))). The concept of territorial sovereignty also retains force in the
persistence of tagjurisdiction in U.S. jurisprudence. See, e.g., Burnham v. Superior Court,
495 U.S. 604, 619 (1990) (upholding "jurisdiction based on physical presence [in the
forum] alone").
75. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 116 (1987).
76. See, e.g., McGee v. Int'l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 222-23 (1957) (noting "the
fundamental transformation of our national economy" resulting in "increasing
nationalization of commerce," while "modern transportation and communication have
made it much less burdensome" to defend against suit in another state); Int'l Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 320 (1945) (noting out-of-state corporation's "systematic and
continuous" activities and "large volume of interstate business" in Washington). But see
Asahi, 480 U.S. at 106-07, 114 (finding exercise of jurisdiction unreasonable in light of
complex international transaction that gave rise to case).
77. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 778 (1950) ("[T]hese prisoners at no
relevant time were within any territory over which the United States is sovereign, and the
scenes of their offense, their capture, their trial and their punishment were all beyond the
territorial jurisdiction of any court of the United States.").
78. Id. at 783 ("The Court of Appeals has cited no authority whatever for holding that
the Fifth Amendment confers rights upon all persons, whatever their nationality, wherever
they are located and whatever their offenses . . . ."). The actual conclusion regarding the
extraterritorial application of the Fifth Amendment, however, was quite narrow. Id. at 785
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as dicta at the time,7 9 and there was good reason to believe that at least
the broader claims of the Eisentrager opinion were modified by the revolu-
tionary holding in Reid. Eisentrager also purported to rely extensively on
assumptions regarding international and comparative law for the proposi-
tion that enemy aliens at home or abroad enjoyed limited or no constitu-
tional protection.8 0 Whatever the validity of these assumptions at the
time, they are of dubious validity under foreign and international law
today.
In United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, which rejected application of the
Fourth Amendment to the search of an alien's property abroad, and in
the recent litigation over U.S. treatment of alien detainees in Iraq,
Afghanistan, and GuantAnamo Bay, courts had largely retained the terri-
("We hold that the Constitution does not confer a right of personal security or an
immunity from military trial and punishment upon an alien enemy engaged in the hostile
service of a government at war with the United States.").
79. Id. at 792-93 (Black,J., dissenting) ("The Government's petition ... presented no
question except that ofjurisdiction; and neither party has argued, orally or in briefs, that
this Court should pass on the sufficiency of the petition.").
80. See id. at 768 (majority opinion) ("We are cited to no instance where a court, in
this or any other country where the writ [of habeas corpus] is known, has issued it on
behalf of an alien enemy who, at no relevant time and in no stage of his captivity, has been
within its territorial jurisdiction."); id. at 769 (invoking "inherent distinctions recognized
throughout the civilized world between citizens and aliens"); id. ("Citizenship as a head of
jurisdiction . . . was old when Paul invoked it in his appeal to Caesar."); id. at 769 n.7
(invoking numerous international law commentators for historic distinction between
friendly and enemy aliens); id. at 772 ("Chancellor Kent, after considering the leading
authorities of his time, declared the law to be that '. . . in war, the subjects of each country
were enemies to each other, and bound to regard and treat each other as such.'"); id.
(invoking Court's "earlier teaching that in war 'every individual of the one nation must
acknowledge every individual of the other nation as his own enemy'"); id. at 773 (noting
principle that aliens are not required to serve in U.S. forces in wartime "also is the doctrine
and the practice of other states comprising our Western Civilization"); id. at 774 (noting
unfettered executive power over enemy aliens "is in keeping with the practices of the most
enlightened of nations"); id. at 775 n.6 (quoting Blackstone for proposition that "[a]t
common law 'alien enemies have no rights, no privileges, unless by the king's special
favour, during the time of war"); id. at 775 n.7 (addressing limited judicial scrutiny of
executive detention or expulsion of enemy aliens as "follow[ing] the practice of the
English courts"); id. at 776 (citing Kent and Story for proposition that enemy aliens "have
no power to sue in the public courts of the enemy nation"); id. (noting U.S. law regarding
nonresident enemy aliens emerged in 1813 based on an examination by New York's
highest court of "the foremost authorities of the Continent and of England," which
concluded "that alien enemies resident in the country of the enemy could not maintain an
action in its courts during the period of hostilities"); id. at 779 ("Except in England, whose
law appears to be in harmony with the views we have expressed, and other English-
speaking peoples in whose practice nothing has been cited to the contrary, the writ of
habeas corpus is generally unknown."). But see International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, art. 9(4), adopted Dec. 16, 1966, S. Exec. Doc. E, 95-2 (1978), 999 U.N.T.S.
171 (entered into force Mar. 3, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR] ("Anyone who is deprived of
his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings before a court, in
order that that court may decide without delay on the lawfulness of his detention and
order his release if the detention is not lawful.").
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torial rationale of the Insular Cases and Eisentrager to deny constitutional
protection to aliens outside the United States.
In other words, modem doctrines regarding the Constitution's appli-
cation to citizens abroad had been brought in step with international law
understandings of a state's extraterritorial authority over its nationals,
even if the two doctrines were not reconciled explicitly. Doctrines re-
garding constitutional protection for aliens abroad, however, had re-
mained tied to a territorial conception of jurisdiction that was anachro-
nistic under international law.
III. THREE APPROACHES To EMBEDDED INTERNATIONAL LAW
The significant historical role of international law in forging U.S. un-
derstandings of the Constitution's application abroad raises the question
of what role modern international conceptions of jurisdiction can, or
should, continue to play in those understandings. The question goes to
the appropriate relationship between international law and constitutional
interpretation, and is by no means limited to the extraterritoriality con-
text.8 1 The question potentially arises whenever international law at one
time played a significant role in informing constitutional meaning, in-
cluding contexts ranging from the proper interpretation of the TakingS82
and Full Faith and Credit Clauses8 3 to the constitutional rights of Native
Americans and immigrants in the United States.8 4
So how should a modern court approach a constitutional provision
whose construction is informed by embedded international law under-
standings? As a practical matter, Supreme Court case law reveals three
approaches to embedded international norms, with sharply contrasting
results for the ongoing influence of international law. I describe these as
evolutionary, entrenchment, and substitution approaches. In this order, they
reflect a decreasing ongoing role for international law in constitutional
analysis.
Under the evolutionary approach, the role of international law in in-
forming a particular constitutional provision remains strong, overt, and
81. See supra note 62.
82. See, e.g., W. River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 507, 532-33 (1848) (power
of eminent domain derived from law of nations); see also Juragua Iron Co. v. United
States, 212 U.S. 297, 298 (1909) (duty to pay just compensation for wartime damage to
property informed by international law); United States v. Pac. R.R., 120 U.S. 227, 234-39
(1887) (same).
83. See, e.g., Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 723 (1988) (noting "expectation
that [the Full Faith and Credit Clause] would be interpreted against . . . principles
developed in international conflicts law"); Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U.S. 562, 581-82
(1906) (applying "principles of international law" to application of Full Faith and Credit
Clause to divorce decree), overruled in part by Williams v. State of North Carolina, 317
U.S. 287 (1942); Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 666 (1892) (addressing "the
fundamental maxim of international law ... [that] '[t]he courts of no country execute the
penal laws of another'").
84. See supra note 62 and infra note 86 and accompanying text.
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evolving over time. Courts continue to look to contemporary interna-
tional rules, as well as to modem foreign law and practice, in determining
constitutional meaning. This approach is visible in Supreme Court deci-
sions determining the scope of the treaty power and admiralty jurisdic-
tion, the relationship between the international laws of war and the com-
mander-in-chief power, and the meaning of "cruel and unusual"
punishment under the Eighth Amendment.8 5 Cases following this ap-
proach recognize that both international and constitutional meaning
evolve over time, and to the extent that courts have looked abroad, they
have looked to the then-contemporary international rules. In other
words, constitutional meaning may evolve in this context as the relevant
international law does. This does not mean that the constitutional provi-
sion is inextricably tied to the international norm. The relationship be-
tween international law and constitutional meaning continues to be me-
diated by the U.S. courts, with sensitivity to unique U.S. constitutional
characteristics and domestic concerns.
The entrenchment approach essentially freezes the international norm
at the point it was first considered in constitutional doctrine. Interna-
tional law informs constitutional analysis at some point, but the constitu-
tional principle does not evolve with later changes in international law.
This largely has been the case with regard to the government's constitu-
tional power to exclude aliens and to regulate Native American affairs.8 6
In each of these contexts, nineteenth-century courts looked to interna-
tional law and embraced the rule they perceived at a particular time (in
the case of immigration law, in the late nineteenth century) to uphold a
specific approach to the government's constitutional power. With regard
to aliens seeking entry, courts looked to international law to embrace a
theory of nearly absolute governmental power to admit or exclude. De-
spite ongoing objections of litigants and advocates that the international
principle was incorrectly interpreted at the time and that it is now no
longer accepted, courts generally have been unwilling to revisit this ques-
85. See generally Cleveland, International Constitution, supra note 1. On the
meaning of the Eighth Amendment, see, for example, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551,
576 (2005) (emphasizing international consensus against capital punishment for juveniles
when determining the evolving meaning of Eighth Amendment); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S.
86, 102 (1958) (taking into account that "[t]he civilized nations of the world are in virtual
unanimity that statelessness is not to be imposed as punishment for crime" in finding
practice barred by Eighth Amendment).
86. See, e.g., Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 279-80 (1955)
(recognizing international law doctrines regarding discovery and conquest inform
government authority to regulate for Native American tribes); United States v. Kagama,
118 U.S. 375, 378-85 (1886) (same); see also Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S.
581, 608-09 (1889) (power to exclude aliens derives from international law); Cleveland,
International Constitution, supra note 1, at 39-44 (discussing role of international law




tion.8 7 Both the constitutional interpretation and the role of interna-
tional law have remained fixed, or entrenched, in their original form.
In the third, substitution approach, international law principles have
been abandoned or modified unrecognizably in favor of other, generally
domestic constitutional considerations. In cases of perfect substitution, a
principle that originated in international law no longer retains any doctri-
nal or interpretive force. The international origins of the principle are
not simply forgotten; the principle itself is completely lost. A striking ex-
ample of substitution is visible in the evolution of the Contract Clause.
Early interpretations of the Contract Clause were rich with references to
universal principles of public law and the practices of other nations.8 8
This approach, however, disappeared quickly during the early nineteenth
century, as domestic considerations in the construction of that clause
took over.
Personal jurisdiction doctrine, on the other hand, could be consid-
ered an example of either evolution or partial substitution. Some domes-
tic considerations have emerged to moderate the role of territorial juris-
diction, such as the reasonableness of exercising jurisdiction over a claim.
The substitution is imperfect, however, because the principle of territo-
rial jurisdiction retains force in the purposeful availment prong of per-
sonal jurisdiction analysis, as well as in the concept of tag jurisdiction.
Moreover, personal jurisdiction could also be considered evolutionary,
since U.S. domestic principles regarding personal jurisdiction have
evolved mostly (though not entirely) consistently with modern interna-
tional law.
Unfortunately, though unsurprisingly, there appears to be no clear
pattern or explanation in the case law for when an evolutionary approach
or entrenchment or substitution prevails. At best, the evolutionary ap-
proach appears to be most pervasive when the constitutional provision at
issue implicates foreign relations (such as in the treaty, Commander-in-
Chief, or admiralty contexts) or where the provision otherwise invites
consideration of evolving common values at home and abroad (such as
the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause). Resort to the evolutionary
approach also turns substantially on the mode of constitutional interpre-
tation employed by a court. A constitutional provision that has been con-
strued by the courts as potentially evolving over time, such as constitu-
tional due process, would be more susceptible to an evolutionary
87. Cf. Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 530-31 (1954) (Frankfurter, J.) ("[M]uch could
be said for the view, were we writing on a clean slate, that the Due Process Clause qualifies
the scope of political discretion heretofore recognized as belonging to Congress in
regulating the entry and deportation of aliens . . .. But the slate is not clean."). But see
Beharry v. Reno, 183 F. Supp. 2d 584, 598 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) ("Since [C]ongress's power over
aliens rests at least in part on international law, it should come as no shock that it may be
limited by changing international law norms."), rev'd, Beharry v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 51 (2d
Cir. 2003).
88. See, e.g., Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 258 (1827) (noting right to
contract derives from law of nations).
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relationship to international law. As Henry Monaghan has observed, an
originalist interpretive approach could also be amenable to an evolution-
ary relationship to international law, to the extent that the Founders of
the Constitution anticipated that a provision would have an evolutionary
meaning. 9
At a minimum, however, where international law has played a role in
inforning constitutional doctrine, principles of comity and harmony in
international relations, without more, suggest that a subsequent change
in international rules creates a duty for courts to reconsider the constitu-
tional doctrine in light of the changed international landscape. They
need not necessarily follow the new international rule, but they should at
least consider the initial reasons for looking to international law and the
reason for the transformation of the international rule.
In the case of extraterritoriality, a foreign relations nexus supports
adopting an evolutionary approach, since extraterritorial conduct often
involves conduct in another state's territory, and conflicts considerations
ran strong in early constitutional approaches based on strict territorial-
ity.90 Because courts generally do not overtly acknowledge the role of
international law in the entrenchment and substitution contexts, the de-
cisions offer few insights into the rationales for these approaches.
Prior to Boumediene, the U.S. approach to extraterritorial application
of the Constitution fell into two of these categories. Constitutional pro-
tections for U.S. nationals abroad had evolved in concert with interna-
tional rules regarding the lawful exercise of extraterritorial power, thus
reflecting a (perhaps latent) evolutionary approach. According to the
U.S. government, however, protections for noncitizens subject to U.S. au-
thority overseas, however, reflected an entrenchment approach: The
doctrines remained tied to the antiquated conceptions of territorial juris-
diction that had first informed them.
This tension between an entrenchment approach to the constitu-
tional rights of aliens abroad, and an evolutionary approach to the rights
of citizens, generated a number of anomalies for the United States. From
the perspective of internal constitutional coherence, it created doctrinal
anomalies between the treatment of citizens and aliens in U.S. custody
beyond our borders. From the perspective of basic respect for the rule of
law, it created the possibility of extraterritorial constitutional "black
holes" for the treatment of aliens abroad. And from the perspective of
comity and international relations, it created conflicts between the
United States's constitutional obligations and international understand-
ings of the government's international state responsibility, as the next
Part indicates.
89. Henry Paul Monaghan, Doing Originalism, 104 Colum. L. Rev. 32, 37-38 (2004)
("Even a strict form of originalism, properly understood, must acknowledge that the
original understanding of some clauses could be fairly read to have included a background
assumption of further judicial development.").
90. See, e.g., In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453, 464-65 (1891).
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IV. CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW: JURISDICTION AS CONTROL
Modern international rules regarding jurisdiction, as applied by in-
ternational and regional human rights bodies and the International
Court of Justice, stood in striking contrast to the United States's pre-
Boumediene approach to the rights of aliens abroad. The major interna-
tional bodies to address the relationship between jurisdiction human
rights obligations, and extraterritorial conduct-the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights, the U.N. human rights treaty bodies, the
International Court of Justice, and the European Court of Human
Rights-all have recognized that a state's extraterritorial exercise of effec-
tive control over either a person or a territory places that conduct within
a state's 'jurisdiction," giving rise to legal responsibility for human rights
violations. Although the European Court of Human Rights has taken the
most cautious approach to this principle, its jurisprudence also recog-
nizes significantly broader extraterritorial jurisdiction over places and
persons than did that of the United States. Moreover, none of these insti-
tutions has drawn the bright line distinction between responsibility over
citizens and aliens that persisted in U.S. law. To the contrary, these tribu-
nals all adopt a pragmatic, totality of the circumstances test for determin-
ing when a state exercises sufficient control to exercise jurisdiction, and
thus to be obligated to respect fundamental rights. They recognize that
in a modern world of instant global communications, global trade and
travel, and international cooperation in military and law enforcement ef-
forts, categorical restrictions based on territory or alienage are
unworkable.
A. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights is charged with
overseeing state compliance with two human rights instruments in the
Americas-the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man 91
and the American Convention on Human Rights.9 2 In construing state
obligations under these instruments, the Commission has adopted an ex-
pansive approach to recognizing human rights obligations for extraterri-
torial conduct such as kidnappings and aerial shootings. In so doing, the
91. Organization of American States, American Declaration of the Rights and Duties
of Man, adopted by the Ninth International Conference of American States (1948),
reprinted in Basic Documents Pertaining to Human Rights in the Inter-American System,
OEA/Ser.L./V/II.71, doc. 6 rev. 1 (1988). The Declaration is nonbinding but has been
understood by the Inter-American human rights institutions as a statement of the
international legal obligations of O.A.S. member states which are not parties to the
American Convention. Interpretation of the American Declaration of the Rights and
Duties of Man Within the Framework of Article 64 of the American Convention on Human
Rights, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Advisory Opinion OC-10/89, (ser. A) No. 10 11 43-47 (1989).
The United States has signed the American Declaration and the American Convention, but
has not ratified the American Convention.
92. Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights, Nov.
22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123.
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Commission has largely abandoned any geographic considerations in de-
termining jurisdiction, and has focused instead on the exercise of "au-
thority and control" over individuals, rather than over territory.
The American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man does not
expressly address the subject of jurisdiction. Article 1 of the American
Convention on Human Rights, however, obligates states parties to respect
the protections of the Convention for all persons "subject to their juris-
diction."9 3 The text is similar to that of the European Convention on
Human Rights in that it explicitly refers only to jurisdiction, not to
terntory.
In the admissibility decision in the 1999 case of Saldatio v. Argentina,
the Commission construed Article 1(1) of the Convention as establishing
extraterritorial state responsibility:
The Commission does not believe . . . that the term "jurisdic-
tion" in the sense of Article 1(1) is limited to or merely coexten-
sive with national territory. Rather, the Commission is of the
view that a state party to the American Convention may be re-
sponsible under certain circumstances for the acts and omis-
sions of its agents which produce effects or are undertaken
outside that state's own territory.9 4
The Commission accordingly articulated an "understanding of juris-
diction-and therefore responsibility for compliance with international
obligations-as a notion linked to authority and effective control, and not
merely to territorial boundaries."95 The Commission noted that the juris-
dictional provision of the American Convention had been modeled upon
the European Convention, and explicitly followed the jurisprudence of
the European Court of Human Rights in Cyprus v. Turkey, Loizidou v.
Turkey, and related cases.9 6
In an early inquiry applying the American Declaration, the
Commission found admissible a petition by Panamanian nationals alleg-
ing human rights violations arising from the U.S. military intervention in
Panama in 1989.97 No question of extraterritorial jurisdiction was raised
by the parties, and the Commission found the claims admissible, with no
analysis, on the grounds that "[w] here it is asserted that a use of military
93. Id. art. 1.
94. Saldaflo v. Argentina, Petition, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 38/99, OEA/Ser.L./
V/II.102, doc. 6 rev. 17 (1999). The petition was brought against Argentina for harms
arising from the prosecution and sentencing of an Argentine national in, and by, the
United States. It was deemed inadmissible for lack of any evidence of exercise of
authority and control" by Argentina. Id. 1 21.
95. Id. 1 19 (emphasis added).
96. Id. 11 17-18. The European cases are discussed infra notes 150-156.
97. U.S. Military Intervention in Panama, Case 10,573, reprinted in I Inter-Am. Y.B.
on Hum. Rts. 476 (1993).
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force has resulted in noncombatant deaths, personal injury, and property
loss, the human rights of noncombatants are implicated."98
In the 1999 case of Coard v. United States, the Commission explicitly
invoked its "authority and control" standard for claims under the
Declaration in a petition brought by persons alleging that they were arbi-
trarily detained by the United States during the 1983 invasion of Gre-
nada.9 9 The Commission stated as follows:
While the extraterritorial application of the American
Declaration has not been placed at issue by the parties, the
Commission finds it pertinent to note that, under certain cir-
cumstances, the exercise of its jurisdiction over acts with an ex-
traterritorial locus will not only be consistent with but required
by the norms which pertain. The fundamental rights of the in-
dividual are proclaimed in the Americas on the basis of the prin-
ciples of equality and non-discrimination-"without distinction
as to race, nationality, creed or sex." Given that individual rights
inhere simply by virtue of a person's humanity, each American
State is obliged to uphold the protected rights of any person sub-
ject to its jurisdiction. While this most commonly refers to persons
within a state's territory, it may, under given circumstances, re-
fer to conduct with an extraterritorial locus where the person
concerned is present in the territory of one state, but subject to
the control of another state-usually through the acts of the lat-
ter's agents abroad. In principle, the inquiry turns not on the
presumed victim's nationality or presence within a particular ge-
ographic area, but on whether, under the specific circum-
stances, the State observed the rights of a person subject to its
authority and control.100
The same year, the Commission elaborated on this standard to up-
hold jurisdiction over a complaint against Cuba for deliberately shooting
down two civilian aircraft operated by Brothers to the Rescue in interna-
98. Id. 1 6, 1 Inter-Am. Y.B. on Hum. Rts. at 512. For earlier proceedings addressing
the Commission's treatment of extraterritorial conduct under the Declaration, see
Disabled Peoples' Int'l v. United States, Application No. 9213, Inter-Am. C.H.R., OEA/
Ser.L./V/II.71, doc. 9 rev. 1, at 184 (1987) (holding admissible petition concerning U.S.
military action in Grenada); Gen. Secretariat of the Org. of Am. States, Inter-Am. Comm'n
on Human Rights, Second Report on the Human Rights Situation in Suriname, OAS/
Ser.L./V/II.66, doc. 21 rev. 1, at 44-45 (1985) (addressing allegations that Government of
Suriname had threatened Surinamese citizens in Holland and Suriname); Gen. Secretariat
of the Org. of Am. States, Inter-Am. Comm'n on Human Rights, Report on the Situation of
Human Rights in Chile, OAS/Ser.L./V/II.66, doc. 17 1 80-91 (1985) (discussing
murders committed outside of Chile).
99. Coard v. United States, Case 10.951, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 109/99, OEA/
Ser.L./V/ll.106, doc. 3 rev. 37 (1999).
100. Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted). The Commission found on the merits
that although the detentions appeared to have a valid security justification, the United
States had failed to afford the detainees an opportunity to test the legality of their
detention "with the least possible delay," in violation of the Declaration. Id. 1 60.
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tional airspace.1 0 Once again invoking the jurisprudence of the
European Court of Human Rights,102 the Commission held that Cuba
was responsible for the extraterritorial aerial shooting.1 03 The Commis-
sion found conclusive evidence that the agents of the Cuban State had
"placed the civilian pilots of the 'Brothers to the Rescue' organization
under their authority," and "that the victims died as a consequence of
direct actions taken by agents of the Cuban State in international
airspace." 104
In 2002, the Commission again recognized extraterritorial jurisdic-
tion under the Declaration in ordering precautionary measures against
the United States on behalf of the Guantdnamo detainees. The
Commission found that the detainees, as persons under the "authority
and control" of a state in a situation of armed conflict, were entitled to
the protection of both international human rights law and international
humanitarian law.105
In short, the Inter-American Commission has understood state juris-
diction within the meaning of the Convention and Declaration to link the
exercise of state control to state responsibility for resulting human rights
violations. The Commission's focus has been decidedly nonterritorial. In
each case, the Commission's concern was with the state's control over a
specific person or situation-not with the state's control over the territory
in which the event occurred.
B. U.N. Treaty Bodies
Unlike the American and European Conventions, the jurisdictional
clauses of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR) and the Convention Against Torture explicitly address territori-
ality. Nevertheless, like the Inter-American Commission, the U.N. treaty
bodies responsible for overseeing state compliance with these treaties
have interpreted jurisdiction in terms of a state's exercise of control over
either persons or places.
1. The Human Rights Committee. - Under Article 2(1) of the ICCPR,
each state party undertakes "to respect and to ensure to all individuals
within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in
the present Covenant." 0 6 This phrasing-"within its territory and sub-
ject to its jurisdiction"-poses some analytic complexity. The phrase
could be read in the conjunctive, to establish that a person would have to
be both "within" a state's territory and subject to its jurisdiction for any
101. Alejandre v. Cuba, Case 11.589, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 86/99, OEA/
Ser.L/V/II.106, doc. 3 rev. 23, 25 (1999).
102. Id. 24.
103. Id. 45.
104. Id. 1 25.
105. Decision on Request for Precautionary Measures (Detainees at Guantdnamo Bay,
Cuba), Inter-Am. C.H.R., OEA/Ser.L/V/II.117, doc 5 rev. 1 1 80 (2002-2003).
106. ICCPR, supra note 80, art. 2.
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Covenant protections to apply. This was the position of the George W.
Bush Administration.1 07 The entire phrase could be understood so that
the limiting clause-"within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction"-
modifies only the obligation "to ensure" Covenant rights, but not the ob-
ligation "to respect" those rights.10 8 The Human Rights Committee, on
the other hand, has construed this jurisdictional provision in the disjunc-
tive-so that the obligations to respect and ensure apply both "to all per-
sons who may be within their territory and to all persons subject to their
jurisdiction."10 9 The First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR supports this
latter interpretation by recognizing the Committee's authority to receive
communications from "individuals subject to [a State Party's] jurisdic-
tion."o1 0 It appears that, at least in early years, the United States agreed
with this approach."' In General Comment Number 31, adopted in
2004, the Committee articulated a "power or effective control" standard
for determining when persons are "subject to" a state's jurisdiction:
107. See U.N. Human Rights Comm., Consideration of Reports Submitted by States
Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant, Concluding Observations of the Human Rights
Comm.: United States of America, 130, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/USA/3 (Nov. 28, 2005)
("[T]he obligations assumed by the United States under the Covenant apply only within
the territory of the United States.").
108. Manfred Nowak, U.N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights CCPR Commentary
43 (2d rev. ed. 2005) ("The obligation of a State party to ensure the rights of the Covenant
relates to all individuals 'within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction' .. ).
109. U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 31, The Nature of the
General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, 1 10, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 (May 26, 2004) [hereinafter General Comment No. 31]. As
Thomas Buergenthal has explained:
[T]he travaux pr6paratoires indicate that efforts to delete "within its territory" or
to substitute "or" for "and" failed for other reasons. It was feared that such
changes might be construed to require the states parties to protect individuals
who are subject to their jurisdiction but living abroad, against the wrongful acts of
the foreign territorial sovereign.
Thomas Buergenthal, To Respect and to Ensure: State Obligations and Permissible
Derogations, in The International Bill of Rights 72, 74 (Louis Henkin ed., 1981) (citation
omitted); see also Legal Consequences of Construction of Wall in Occupied Palestinian
Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, 179 (July 9) ("[T]he drafters of the Covenant
did not intend to allow States to escape from their obligations when they exercise
jurisdiction outside their national territory."). For recent debate over the extraterritorial
reach of the ICCPR, see Michael J. Dennis & Andre M. Surena, Application of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in Times of Armed Conflict and
Military Occupation: The Gap Between Legal Theory and State Practice, 2008 Eur. Hum.
Rts. L. Rev. 714; see also Nigel Rodley, The Extraterritorial Reach and Applicability in
Armed Conflict of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: A Rejoinder to
Dennis and Surena, 2009 Eur. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 628.
110. Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art.
1, opened for signature Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 302 (entered into force Mar. 23,
1976).
111. See U.N. Human Rights Comm., Summary Record of the Hundred and Ninety-
Fourth Meeting, May 16, 1950, 1 32, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SR.194 (May 25, 1950) (United
States delegation explaining that military "troops, although maintained abroad, remained
under the jurisdiction of the State").
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This means that a State party must respect and ensure the rights
laid down in the Covenant to anyone within the power or effective
control of that State Party, even if not situated within the territory
of the State Party. .. . This principle also applies to those within
the power or effective control of the forces of a State Party acting
outside its territory, regardless of the circumstances in which
such power or effective control was obtained, such as forces
constituting a national contingent of a State Party assigned to
an international peace-keeping or peace-enforcement opera-
tion.11 2
The Committee has not subsequently elaborated extensively on the
meaning of "effective control." In earlier opinions, however, the
Committee had made clear that Convention obligations applied in extra-
territorial situations, including situations of armed conflict. In reviewing
states' periodic reports under the ICCPR, the Committee noted with ap-
proval Belgium's recognition of the applicability of the Covenant to the
actions of Belgian soldiers in Somalia as part of the United Nations
Operation in Somalia.11 s The Committee also condemned an Iranian
religious authority's issuance of a fatwa calling for the murder of Salman
Rushdie, a foreign national residing abroad.1 14 Most recently, the
Committee has rejected the United States's position that Covenant obli-
gations do not extend to U.S. treatment of persons outside U.S. territory,
including in Guantinamo and elsewhere.1 15
In 1981, in addressing an individual communication involving
Uruguay's kidnapping of a Uruguayan citizen in Argentina and his later
imprisonment and torture in Uruguay, the Committee observed in L6pez
Burgos v. Uruguay that the fact that the initial kidnapping took place
outside of Uruguayan territory did not deprive the Committee ofjurisdic-
112. General Comment No. 31, supra note 109, 10 (emphasis added).
113. U.N. Human Rights Comm., Consideration of Reports Submitted by States
Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant, Concluding Observations of the Human Rights
Comm.: Belgium, 1 14, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.99 (Nov. 19, 1998) (noting
"concern[ ]" for Belgian soldiers' behavior in Somalia, but acknowledging "that the State
Party has recognized the applicability of the Covenant in this respect").
114. U.N. Human Rights Comm., Consideration of Reports Submitted by States
Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant, Comments of the Human Rights Comm.: Iran
(Islamic Republic of), 1 9, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.25 (Aug. 3, 1993); see also U.N.
Human Rights Comm., Views of the Human Rights Comm. Under Article 5, Paragraph 4,
of the Optional Protocol to the Int'l Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 6.1, U.N.
Doc. CCPR/C/18/D/77/1980 (Mar. 31, 1983) (concluding state's denial of passport to
citizen residing abroad was exercise of state's jurisdiction for purposes of Covenant).
115. U.N. Human Rights Comm., Consideration of Reports Submitted by States
Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant, Concluding Observations of the Human Rights
Comm.: United States of America, 10, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/USA/CO/3 (Sept. 15, 2006)
(noting "with concern the restrictive interpretation made by the State party of its
obligations under the Covenant," because of "its position that the Covenant does not apply
with respect to individuals under its jurisdiction but outside its territory, nor in times of
war, despite the contrary opinions and established jurisprudence of the Committee and
the International Court of Justice").
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tion under either the Optional Protocol or the Covenant, since the acts
"were perpetrated by Uruguayan agents acting on foreign soil."" 6 Like
the Inter-American Commission, the Human Rights Committee found
that the critical relationship was between the state and the individual, not
the state and a particular territory. The Committee reasoned that "indi-
viduals subject to [a State Party's] jurisdiction" under the Optional
Protocol referred "not to the place where the violation occurred, but
rather to the relationship between the individual and the State in relation to a
violation of any of the rights set forth in the Covenant, wherever they
occurred."' 17 Turning to the Covenant itself, the Committee maintained
that Article 2(1) did not imply that a state "cannot be held accountable"
for acts committed by its agents on foreign soil, "whether with the acqui-
escence of the Government of that State or in opposition to it."118 It
concluded that "it would be unconscionable to so interpret the responsi-
bility under article 2 of the Covenant as to permit a State party to perpe-
trate violations of the Covenant on the territory of another State, which
violations it could not perpetrate on its own territory." 1 9
The Committee also has tentatively acknowledged the complexities
that may arise if all Covenant obligations apply in an extraterritorial con-
text-a question that the European Court of Human Rights has consid-
ered more extensively. In Ldpez Burgos, Committee Member Christian
Tomuschat wrote separately to note the potential overbreadth of a posi-
tion that Covenant obligations always apply extraterritorially. Tomuschat
recognized that there are practical barriers to a state's ability to afford all
the protections of the Covenant to its citizens who are residing in another
country, even though citizens remain subject to the jurisdiction of their
state of nationality. Likewise, states occupying a foreign territory may not
be able to afford all persons in that territory the protections of the
Covenant, because under international humanitarian law the occupying
state has a competing duty to respect the existing domestic laws of the
occupied territory. He noted that these considerations may have
animated the choice of the jurisdictional formula in Article 2 of the
ICCPR. "Never was it envisaged, however," he observed, "to grant States
parties unfettered discretionary power to carry out wilful and deliberate
116. U.N. Human Rights Comm., Views of the Human Rights Comm. Under Article 5,
Paragraph 4, of the Optional Protocol to the Int'l Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
12.1, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/13/D/52/1979 (July 29, 1981) [hereinafter Human Rights
Comm., L6pez Burgos); accord U.N. Human Rights Comm., Views of the Human Rights
Comm. Under Article 5, Paragraph 4, of the Optional Protocol to the Int'l Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, 10.3, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/13/D/56/1979 (July 29, 1981)
[hereinafter Human Rights Comm., Casariego] (concluding Uruguay's extraterritorial
arrest of Uruguayan national in Brazil and her later detention in Uruguay gave rise to
Covenant violations).





attacks against the freedom and personal integrity of their citizens living
abroad." 120
Building on this reasoning, the Committee has condemned Israel for
failing to "fully apply" the Covenant in its occupied territories.12 1 The
Committee saw this duty as arising from Israel's long-standing presence in
the territories, its exercise of "effective jurisdiction" there through its se-
curity forces, and its "ambiguous attitude" toward the future indepen-
dence of the territories. 122
In short, the Committee has adopted a retail approach to the extra-
territorial reach of ICCPR obligations. Jurisdiction arises, not based on
the location where the harm occurs, but from the relationship between
the state and the individual with regard to a particular Covenant obliga-
tion. Where the state exercises "effective control" over an individual in a
manner that implicates a particular Covenant right, jurisdiction arises for
purposes of that right only. Even certain forms of temporary military oc-
cupation of a territory, however, would not necessarily give rise to applica-
tion of full Covenant obligations. Thus, in a temporarily occupied terri-
tory, a state would owe a duty not to torture or arbitrarily detain a foreign
national in its custody, but would not be obligated to rewrite wholesale
the laws of that territory to comply with the requirements of the
Covenant.
Notably, the alien status of a victim does not warrant denial of the
Covenant's protections in any of the extraterritorial cases addressed by
the Committee. The Committee has made clear that the Covenant's ap-
plication to any "individual" means exactly that.1 23 With rare exceptions,
protections of the Covenant apply to all persons in a state's jurisdiction,
not simply to citizens, or to aliens from a friendly state. The other tribu-
nals addressed in this section similarly treat alienage as irrelevant to the
question of extraterritoriality.
Finally, the Committee's approach is not without supporters. While
states may not agree entirely with the Committee's interpretation of the
Covenant's geographic scope, a number of States Parties have formally
120. Id. at app. (opinion by Christian Tomuschat).
121. U.N. Human Rights Comm., Consideration of Reports Submitted by States
Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant, Concluding Observations of the Human Rights
Comm.: Israel, 1 10, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.93 (Aug. 18, 1998).
122. Id. The Committee reaffirmed its position in 2003. U.N. Human Rights Comm.,
Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant,
Concluding Observations of Human Rights Comm.: Israel, 11, U.N. Doc. CCPR/CO/
78/1SR (Aug. 21, 2003) [hereinafter U.N. Human Rights Comm., Israel 2003].
123. See U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 15: The Position of
Aliens Under the Covenant, 1 2 (1986), in 1 Human Rights Instruments: Compilation of
General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Bodies,
U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.9 (May 27, 2008) ("[T]he general rule is that each one of the
rights of the Covenant must be guaranteed without discrimination between citizens and
aliens."); General Comment No. 31, supra note 109, 1 10 ("[T]he enjoyment of Covenant
rights is not limited to citizens of States Parties but must also be available to all individuals,
regardless of nationality or statelessness . . . .").
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acknowledged to the Committee that they accept some extraterritorial
reach for the Covenant, including with respect to military activities in
Iraq and Afghanistan.124
2. The Committee Against Torture. - The Convention Against
Torture 2 5 does not have a single jurisdictional provision, but addresses
jurisdiction in a range of contexts. Article 2(1) of the Convention obli-
gates states to "take effective legislative, administrative, judicial or other
measures" to prevent torture-in other words, to exercise prescriptive,
adjudicative and enforcementjurisdiction-"in any territory under its ju-
risdiction."12 6 The separate duty to prosecute acts of torture extends be-
yond territorial jurisdiction to other bases for jurisdiction under interna-
tional law. Article 5(1) of the Convention obligates or allows a state to
criminally punish acts of torture that occur "in any territory under its
jurisdiction" or on board the state's ship or aircraft, or if the offender or
the victim is a national of the state, or if the offender is "in any territory
under its jurisdiction," regardless of where the act occurred (in other
words, universal jurisdiction) .127
The Torture Convention thus appears to define jurisdiction in classi-
cal international law terms. It establishes a duty to prevent torture in any
territory under a state's jurisdiction, and establishes a duty to punish acts
of torture if the act occurred or the offender is present in territory sub-
ject to the state's jurisdiction, or in other classic contexts of extraterrito-
124. See, e.g., U.N. Human Rights Comm., Consideration of Reports Submitted by
States Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant: Comments by the Government of
Germany to the Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee, at 3, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/CO/80/DEU/Add.1 (Apr. 11, 2005) ("Whenever its police or armed forces are
deployed abroad, in particular when participating in peace missions, Germany ensures to
all persons that they will be granted the rights recognized in the Covenant, insofar as they
are subject to its jurisdiction."); U.N. Human Rights Comm., Consideration of Reports
Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant: The United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland, 1 24, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GBR/CO/6/Add.1 (Nov. 3,
2009) ("We are prepared to accept that the UK's obligations under the ICCPR could in
principle apply to persons taken into custody by UK forces and held in military detention
facilities outside the UK."); U.N. Human Rights Comm., Replies to the List of Issues
(CCPR/C/AUS/Q/5) to Be Taken up in Connection with the Consideration of the Fifth
Periodic Report of the Government of Australia, 1 16, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/AUS/Q/5/
Add.1 (Feb. 5, 2009) ("Australia accepts that there may be exceptional circumstances in
which the rights and freedoms set out under the Covenant may be relevant beyond the
territory of a State party . . . ."); see also Comit6 des droits de l'homme, Examen des
rapports presentes par les 6tats parties en vertu de l'article 40 pacte: cinquiame rapport
p(riodique: Belgique, at 17, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/BEL/5 (July 17, 2009) (noting that when
Belgian forces are deployed abroad, particularly while participating in peacekeeping
missions, the State will ensure individuals under its jurisdiction will be granted rights
recognized by the Covenant). I am grateful to Gerald Neuman for bringing these
developments to my attention.
125. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, adopted Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-20 (1988), 1465
U.N.T.S. 85.
126. Id. art. 2.
127. Id. art. 5.
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rial jurisdiction (flag jurisdiction, nationality, and passive personality). It
further obligates a state, "in any territory under its jurisdiction," to pre-
vent acts of "cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment."1 28
The critical extraterritoriality question for the Committee Against
Torture accordingly has been to determine the meaning of "territory
under its jurisdiction." Although this phrase facially links jurisdiction and
territory, it is interesting to note that even here jurisdiction is not clearly
limited to a state's own sovereign territory, but extends to "any territory
under [the state's] jurisdiction." Guantinamo, for example, is subject to
the United States's "complete jurisdiction and control,"129 although the
United States disclaims formal sovereignty there.
In the most comprehensive statement of extraterritorial jurisdiction
of any of the international or regional tribunals, the Committee has inter-
preted this concept as encompassing all territories, and all persons, over
which a state exercises any form of "effective control," whether "directly
or indirectly, in whole or in part, de jure or de facto." In General
Comment No. 2, which was adopted in November 2007, the Committee
stated as follows:
Article 2, paragraph 1, requires that each State party shall take
effective measures to prevent acts of torture not only in its sover-
eign territory but also "in any territory under its jurisdiction."
The Committee has recognized that "any territory" includes all
areas where the State party exercises, directly or indirectly, in whole or in
part, dejure or defacto effective control, in accordance with interna-
tional law. The reference to "any territory" . . . refers to prohib-
ited acts committed not only on board a ship or aircraft regis-
tered by a State party, but also during military occupation or
peacekeeping operations and in such places as embassies, mili-
tary bases, detention facilities, or other areas over which a State
exercises factual or effective control.13 0
The Committee observed that its interpretation of territory subject to
a state's jurisdiction was consistent with the obligation under Article
5(1) (b) of the Convention to exercise jurisdiction over the state's own
nationals, wherever they may act.1 31 The Committee further noted that
"territory" "also include[s] situations where a State party exercises, di-
rectly or indirectly, de facto or de jure control over persons in deten-
tion."13 2 Furthermore,
128. Id. arts. 11-13, 16.
129. Lease of Lands for Coaling and Naval Stations, U.S.-Cuba, art. III, Feb. 23, 1903,
T.S. 418 ("[D]uring the period of the occupation of the United States of said areas under
the terms of this agreement the United States shall exercise complete jurisdiction and
control over and within said areas . . . .").
130. U.N. Comm. Against Torture, General Comment No. 2: Implementation of
Article 2 by States Parties, 1 16, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/GC/2 (Jan. 24, 2008) (emphasis
added).
131. Id.
132. Id. (emphasis added).
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the concept of "any territory under its jurisdiction," . . . includes
any territory or facilities and must be applied to protect any per-
son, citizen or non-citizen without discrimination subject to the
dejure or de facto control of a State party. The Committee em-
phasizes that the State's obligation to prevent torture also applies
to all persons who act, de jure or defacto, in the name of in conjunction
with, or at the behest of the State party.1 3
In sum, the Committee construes a state's jurisdiction under the
Convention as extending to all territories or facilities under its de facto
effective control, to all nationals and agents of the state, and to all per-
sons in the state's de facto detention. The analysis, while broad, is consis-
tent with international law's recognition of extraterritorial jurisdiction
over a state's nationals as well as those persons over whom a state exer-
cises complete or effective control.
The Committee had previously applied this standard in reviewing
state reports, notably those of the United Kingdom1 34 and the United
States.1 3 5  The Committee pointedly disagreed with the United
Kingdom's position that persons under de facto British authority in
Afghanistan and Iraq were not under U.K. jurisdiction, noting that juris-
diction "includes all areas under the de facto effective control of the State
party's authorities."1 3 6 The Committee similarly called upon the United
States to ensure the protections of the Convention to "all persons under
the effective control of its authorities, . . . wherever located in the
world."' 3 7
The United States, however, has objected to the Committee's inter-
pretation of the extraterritorial scope of the Convention. In its observa-
tions on General Comment No. 2, the United States indicated that while
it did not generally object to the General Comment as a pronouncement
of policy for improving implementation of the convention, it did not
agree that, as a legal matter, "'de facto control' equates with 'territory
133. Id. 7 (emphasis added).
134. See U.N. Comm. Against Torture, Conclusions and Recommendations of the
Committee Against Torture: United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,
Crown Dependencies and Overseas Territories, 4, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/CR/33/3 (Dec. 10,
2004) [hereinafter Conclusions & Recommendations: United Kingdom] ("[T]he
Committee observes that the Convention protections extend to all territories under the
jurisdiction of a State party and considers that this principle includes all areas under the de
facto effective control of the State party's authorities." (emphasis omitted)).
135. U.N. Comm. Against Torture, Conclusions and Recommendations of the
Committee Against Torture: United States of America, 15, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/USA/CO/
2 (July 25, 2006) [hereinafter Conclusions & Recommendations: United States]
(reiterating that State party's jurisdiction "includes all areas under the de facto effective
control of the State party, by whichever military or civil authorities such control is
exercised" and rejecting view "that those provisions are geographically limited to its own de
jure territory").
136. Conclusions & Recommendations: United Kingdom, supra note 134, 4(b)
(emphasis omitted).
137. Conclusions & Recommendations: United States, supra note 135, 1 15.
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under its jurisdiction."' 1 3 8 The United States also pointed to Article 5 of
the Convention's application to offenses committed "on board a ship or
aircraft registered in that State" as evidence that "I[i]f the drafters had
intended for Article 2 to extend beyond the territory under a State Party's
jurisdiction, they would have reflected that intent in the words of the
Convention."' 3 9
The Committee Against Torture is responsible for overseeing state
compliance with only two related types of human rights violations: tor-
ture, and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment. Unlike, for example,
the right to education, the obligation not to commit torture or to allow its
commission by a state's agents does not generally require control of a
territory in order for a state to give it effect. Instead, the state must exer-
cise control over its agents. The Committee Against Torture therefore
has not confronted the difficulty posed by other human rights conven-
tions (and by constitutions) of determining when a state's relationship
with a person or territory is sufficient to give rise to a broad menu of
human rights obligations. The Committee nevertheless has addressed
state responsibility functionally, by focusing on circumstances when a
state is able to carry out the obligations of the Convention as a practical
matter, without regard to any formal distinctions regarding the location
of the conduct or the identity of the perpetrator or victim.' 4 0
C. The International Court ofJustice
Building upon its recognition that either "physical control" of a terri-
tory or complete or "effective control" over operatives or conduct
abroad1 4 1 gives rise to international legal obligations, the International
Court of Justice has embraced an effective control approach to jurisdic-
tion under human rights treaties. In its 2004 Wall Advisory Opinion, the
court found that Israel's exercise of jurisdiction over the Occupied
138. Observations by the United States of America on Committee Against Torture
General Comment No. 2: Implementation of Article 2 by States Parties (Nov. 3, 2008) Is
2, 28 (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
139. Id. 1 29.
140. Other treaty bodies have adopted an analogous approach. See, e.g., U.N.
Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights, Concluding Observations of the Committee on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Israel, 8, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.27 (Dec. 4,
1998) ("The Committee is of the view that the State's obligations under the Covenant
apply to all territories and populations under its effective control."); U.N. Comm. on the
Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Concluding Observations of the Committee on the
Elimination of Racial Discrimination: Israel, 1 32, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/ISR/CO/13 (June
14, 2007) ("The Committee reiterates its concern at the position of the State party . .. that
the Convention does not apply in the Occupied Palestinian Territories... ."); U.N. Comm.
on the Rights of the Child, Concluding Observations: Israel, 1 2, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/15/
Add.195 (Oct. 9, 2002) (noting "the responsibility of the State party for the
implementation of the Convention in the occupied Palestinian territories").
141. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 65 (June 27)
(noting state must exert "effective control" over operatives in foreign territory to incur
liability for human rights violations).
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Palestinian Territories triggered Israel's obligations under the ICCPR, the
International Covenant on Social, Economic and Cultural Rights, and the
Convention on the Rights of the Child. The ICJ observed that although a
state's jurisdiction is "primarily territorial, it may sometimes be exercised
outside the national territory."' 42 The court noted with approval the
Human Rights Committee's "constant practice" of recognizing that extra-
territorial acts may fall within a state's jurisdiction, citing the Committee's
early cases involving extraterritorial kidnappings by Uruguay and its deci-
sions relating to Israel's responsibility in the Occupied Territories. 14 3 In
2005, the court reaffirmed this principle in recognizing that Uganda's
occupation in the northeastern part of Congo gave rise to obligations
under international human rights and international humanitarian law
treaties. The court reiterated that "international human rights instru-
ments are applicable 'in respect of acts done by a State in the exercise of
its jurisdiction outside its own territory,' particularly in occupied
territories." 144
D. The European Court of Human Rights and Al-Skeini
This brings us back to the Al-Skeini case and the jurisprudence of the
European Court of Human Rights. Although AI-Skeini was a decision of
the U.K domestic courts, the judges' interpretation of the extraterritorial
scope of obligations under the European Convention was governed by
the jurisprudence of the European Court.14 5 That court, in turn, has
given extensive consideration to extraterritorial obligations under the
treaty. The European Court also to date has adopted a somewhat more
restrictive view of the extraterritorial reach of a state's human rights obli-
gations under the European Convention than the other international
tribunals addressed above. This caution is attributable in part to the re-
gional character of the European Convention, as well as to other textual
provisions in the Convention.14 6
142. Legal Consequences of Construction of Wall in Occupied Palestinian Territory,
Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, 179 (July 9).
143. Id. at 179-80.
144. Armed Activities on Territory of Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), (I.C.J.
Judgment of Dec. 19, 2005) at 70, available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/116/
10455.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (citing Legal Consequences of Wall, 2004
I.C.J. at 178-81).
145. An application for review before the European Court of Human Rights was
pending at the time of publication. See Al-Skeini v. United Kingdom, App. No. 55721/07,
Statement of Facts (Eur. Ct. H.R. Dec. 17, 2008), available at http://www.echr.coe.int/
ECHR/EN/Header/Case-Law/HUDOC/HUDOC+database/ (follow "HUDOC"
hyperlink; follow "Communicated Cases Collection" hyperlink on left sidebar; input "al-
skeini" in "Text" field; press search; follow "55721/07 Statement of Facts" hyperlink) (on
file with the Columbia Law Review).
146. Article 56 of the Convention, for example, allows state parties to declare the
applicability of the Convention "to . . . territories for whose international relations it is
responsible," and provides that the Convention shall be applied in such territories "with
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1. The European Court of Human Rights. - As noted in the
Introduction, the European Convention provides that States Parties must
afford the protections of the Convention "to everyone within their juris-
diction."147 Territory is not mentioned. Unlike the U.N. Human Rights
Committee and the U.N. Committee Against Torture, which have moved
away from the textual references to territory in their respective conven-
tions, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has leaned toward
imputing a territorial meaning into jurisdiction where no textual refer-
ence exists. In construing the concept of 'jurisdiction" in light of public
international law and the purposes and understandings surrounding the
Convention, the court has held that the Convention is to be applied "no-
tably in the legal space . . . of the Contracting States."1 4 8 But the court
also has recognized "exceptional" circumstances, where a state's "effective
control" of a territory beyond its borders, or the state's exercise of control
over persons abroad through its agents, can trigger jurisdiction under the
Convention. 149 And in Al-Skeini, the Law Lords and the U.K government
concluded that this extraterritorial jurisdiction reached the torture and
murder of an Iraqi national in a British military prison in Iraq.
Leading early decisions of the European Court on extraterritorial
jurisdiction involved Turkey's occupation of parts of northern Cyprus
and the acts of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), the
local authority established there. In its preliminary objections judgment
in Loizidou v. Turkey,150 the court held that "the concept of 'jurisdiction'
under [Article 1] is not restricted to the national territory of the High
Contracting Parties," and establishes state responsibility for acts of a
state's authorities, "whether performed within or outside national bound-
aries, which produce effects outside their own territory."15 1 Furthermore,
state responsibility may arise under the Convention
when as a consequence of military action-whether lawful or un-
lawful-it exercises effective control of an area outside its na-
tional territory. The obligation to secure, in such an area, the
rights and freedoms set out in the Convention derives from the
fact of such control whether it be exercised directly, through its
armed forces, or through a subordinate local administration. 152
Note that the court here is not referring to jurisdiction in the classi-
cal prescriptive sense to determine when a state may lawfully act abroad.
Instead, the court is addressing jurisdiction as control-the de facto exer-
due regard, however, to local requirements." Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, supra note 6, arts. 56(1) and (3).
147. Id. art. 1.
148. Bankovit v. Belgium, 2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 333, 359.
149. See infra notes 163-168.
150. Loizidou v. Turkey, 310 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1995) (Judgment on Preliminary
Objections).
151. Id. at 23-24.
152. Id. at 24 (emphasis added).
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cise of authority, "whether lawful or unlawful," which gives rise to legal
responsibility for harms committed.
In its merits judgment, the court reaffirmed this articulation of state
responsibility, finding that it was unnecessary to determine whether
Turkey "exercisel[d] detailed control" over the TRNC.15 s Turkey's large
military presence in northern Cyprus made it "obvious" that the Turkish
military exercised "effective control" over the region. Such control estab-
lished Turkey's "responsibility for the policies and actions" of the
TRNC.154 The court therefore concluded that "[t]hose affected by such
policies or actions therefore come within the 'jurisdiction' of Turkey for
purposes of Article 1 of the Convention."15 5 The court again applied this
analysis to find Turkey liable for human rights violations in Cyprus v.
Turkey.' 5 6 In the Cyprus cases, therefore, the European Court at least
suggested that 'jurisdiction" would encompass the effective control of a
territory, the "detailed control" over particular extraterritorial acts, or the
extraterritorial acts of a state's agents, presumably including acts that af-
fected only a specific person or persons, rather than a territory.
The ECHR appeared to retreat from this reading of jurisdiction in
Bankovie v. Belgium.'5 7 Bankovie involved NATO's 1999 aerial bombing of
a Serbian-controlled radio and television station in Belgrade.15 8 The ap-
plicants alleged that all seventeen NATO states participating in the NATO
campaign were jointly liable, regardless of whether they had actually par-
ticipated in the bombing or exercised any control over it.' 5 9 This politi-
cally charged case was decided in December 2001, while the United
Kingdom was heavily involved in the U.S. war in Afghanistan. The ques-
tion for the court was whether the air strike constituted "control" so that
the conduct fell within the 'jurisdiction" of the participating NATO states
for purposes of the Convention.16 0
In construing the concept of 'jurisdiction" under Article 1, the court
observed that it must consider "any relevant rules of international law ...
[and] determine State responsibility in conformity with the governing
principles of international law,"'61 while also considering the travaux and
the Convention's special status as a human rights treaty. The court then
proceeded to equate jurisdiction under the Convention with classical
conceptions of jurisdiction under international law.16 2
153. Loizidou v. Turkey, 1996-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 2216, 2235 (Judgment on Merits).
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. See Cyprus v. Turkey, 2001-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 25 (citing Loizidou and finding
that Turkey's Article I jurisdiction extended over northern Cyprus because of its effective
control there).
157. Bankovit v. Belgium, 2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 333.
158. Id. at 340.
159. Id. at 345.
160. Id. at 350.
161. Id. at 351.
162. Id. at 351-53.
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As to the "ordinary meaning" of the relevant terms in Article 1
of the Convention, the Court is satisfied that, from the stand-
point of public international law, the jurisdictional competence
of a State is primarily territorial. While international law does
not exclude a State's exercise of jurisdiction extraterritorially,
the suggested bases of such jurisdiction (including nationality,
flag, diplomatic and consular relations, effect, protection, pas-
sive personality and universality) are, as a general rule, defined
and limited by the sovereign territorial rights of the other rele-
vant states. 6 3
The court continued:
Accordingly, for example, a State's competence to exercise juris-
diction over its own nationals abroad is subordinate to that
State's and other States' territorial competence. In addition, a
State may not actually exercise jurisdiction on the territory of
another without the latter's consent, invitation or acquiescence
unless the former is an occupying State, in which case it can be
found to exercise jurisdiction in that territory, at least in certain
respects.164
The court concluded that the Convention "must be considered to
reflect this ordinary and essentially territorial notion of jurisdiction,"
while recognizing other "exceptional" bases of jurisdiction based on the
particular circumstances of each case.16 5  The court found that the
travaux and state practice under the Convention confirmed this
reading.1 6 6
Turning to the scope of any extraterritorial exceptions, the court
looked to prior jurisprudence of the court and the European
Commission, particularly the decisions regarding Turkey in Cyprus.' 6 7
The court found that these decisions elaborated a rule that a state exer-
cises jurisdiction when it, "through the effective control of the relevant
territory and its inhabitants abroad as a consequence of military occupa-
163. Id. at 351-52 (citing F.A. Mann, The Doctrine of Jurisdiction in International
Law, in 1 Recueil des Cours (1964); F.A. Mann, The Doctrine of International Jurisdiction
Revisited After Twenty Years, in Recueil des Cours (1984); Jurisdiction of States, in 3
Encyclopedia of Public International Law 55-59 (Rudolph Bernhardt ed., 1997); Extra-
territorial Effects of Administrative, Judicial and Legislative Acts, in 2 Encyclopedia of
Public International Law 337-43 (Rudolph Bernhardt ed., 1995); Oppenheim's
International Law, supra note 26, § 137; Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Droit International Public 61
(4th ed. 1998); Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law 287, 301, 312-14 (5th
ed. 1998)).
164. Id. at 352 (citations omitted) (citing 3 Encyclopedia of Public International Law,
supra note 163; 2 Encyclopedia of Public International Law, supra note 163; 1
Oppenheim's International Law, supra note 25, § 137; Dupuy, supra note 163, at 64-65;
Brownlie, supra note 163, at 313; Antonio Cassese, International Law 89 (1st ed. 2001);
Venice Comm'n, Council of Europe, Report on the Preferential Treatment of National
Minorities by Their Kin-States 16, CDL-INF (2001) 19 (Oct. 22, 2001)).
165. Id.
166. Id. at 352-53.
167. Id. at 355.
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tion or through the consent, invitation or acquiescence of the govern-
ment of that territory, exercises all or some of the public powers normally
to be exercised by that government."168 Jurisdiction also arose in "cases
involving the activities of [a state's] diplomatic or consular agents abroad
and on board craft and vessels registered in, or flying the flag of, that
State." In such cases both treaties and customary international law
"recognised the extraterritorial exercise of jurisdiction by the relevant
State."169 The court thus shifted its interpretation of jurisdiction under
the Convention from focusing on de facto control in the earlier cases, to
a test that was designed to determine the international legality of extra-
territorial conduct under prescriptive jurisdiction.
Addressing whether "effective control" had been exercised by the
NATO member states in this case, the court rejected the applicants' sug-
gestion that the "effective control" test should be tailored to require com-
pliance with Convention obligations to the extent of the extraterritorial
control that was exercised. The applicants' proposed reading comported
with the retail approach of the Inter-American Commission and the U.N.
Human Rights Committee. Both of these bodies have recognized that a
state's "control" over a particular person or situation is sufficient for a
finding of jurisdiction over the violations that arise from that relation-
ship. (The Inter-American Commission's decision in Brothers to the
Rescue1 7 0 is the most directly analogous case to Bankovi6.) The European
Court rejected this approach, however, as "tantamount to arguing that
anyone adversely affected by an act imputable to a Contracting State,
wherever in the world that act may have been committed or its conse-
quences felt, is thereby brought within the jurisdiction of that State." 7 1
(This is, of course, precisely how the Committee Against Torture has elu-
cidated obligations under the Torture Convention.) Faced with the ap-
plication of a wide-ranging set of treaty obligations, however, the
European Court read this as a suggestion that the Convention obligations
be "divided and tailored" according to the particular circumstances of the
exercise of jurisdiction, and was unwilling to accept this suggestion.1 7 2
The court objected that the approach would collapse any distinction be-
tween jurisdiction and the presence of a violation of any particular
Convention right. Had the drafters of the Convention intended such a
result, the court reasoned, they could have provided that the Convention
applies in all circumstances, as do the four Geneva Conventions.1 7 3
The court declined to follow the approach of the Human Rights
Committee on this question, which it seemed to feel had overreached in
168. Id.
169. Id. at 356.
170. Alejandre v. Cuba, Case 11.589, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 86/99, OEA/
Ser.L./V/II.106, doc. 3 rev. (1999).





its efforts to read a territorial restriction out of the ICCPR, in the face of
contrary evidence in the negotiating history.1 74  It found the Inter-
American Commission's decision in Coard v. United States unpersuasive,
since the American Declaration contains no explicit jurisdictional provi-
sion. The court noted that the American Convention contained jurisdic-
tional language similar to the ECHR, but observed that no case constru-
ing that language had been brought to its attention-ironic, given that
the Inter-American Commission itself had relied on the jurisprudence of
the ECHR in finding that the American Convention applied extraterrito-
rially.17 5 Bankovic's ultimate conclusion regarding the tailoring of rights
to the scope of control is unclear, however, since the court ultimately
endorsed the view that the Convention would apply to the extraterritorial
arrest and detention of an individual,17 6 where it would seem that its
same concern about a duty to apply the whole Convention would pertain.
Finally, the court denied that finding the Convention inapplicable
would create a "vacuum in the system of human rights protection."' 7 7
The court concluded that the "vacuum" concept, which had been articu-
lated in the Turkish cases, was limited to territories, such as Cyprus, that
were already subject to the Convention (e.g., within the Convention's "le-
gal space (espace juridique)") and thus already entitled to the
Convention's protection.17 8 Serbia, on the other hand, fell outside of the
Convention's legal space. The court concluded that an intentional aerial
bombing did not create any "jurisdictional link" between the victims and
the responsible states.1 7 9
Bankovie appeared to mark a retreat from the court's earlier sugges-
tions about the Convention's extraterritorial scope.18 0 By relying on
classical grounds for prescriptive jurisdiction, the court appeared to con-
fuse the bases for finding that a state acted lawfully abroad, and the
grounds for finding that a state should be held legally responsible for
extraterritorial conduct, regardless of whether it was lawful or not. Nev-
174. See id. at 357-58 (discussing Article 2, § 2 of the ICCPR and noting that "as early
as 1950 the drafters had definitively and specifically confined its territorial scope" and
rejecting argument "that exceptional recognition by the United Nations Human Rights
Committee of certain instances of extraterritorial jurisdiction . . . displaces . . . the
territorial jurisdiction expressly conferred by that Article . . . or explains the precise
meaning of 'jurisdiction' in Article I of its Optional Protocol").
175. Id. at 357.
176. See id. at 346 (noting respondent States argued "arrest and detention of the
applicants outside the territory of the respondent State in ... [other cases] constituted ...
a classic exercise of such legal authority or jurisdiction over those persons").
177. Id. at 358 (quoting Cyprus v. Turkey, 2001-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 25).
178. Id. at 358-59.
179. Id. at 359.
180. See, e.g., Cyprus v. Turkey, App. Nos. 6780/74 & 6950/75, 2 Eur. Comm'n H.R.
Dec. & Rep. 125, 136 (1975) (holding phrase "within their jurisdiction" in the Convention
"is not .. . limited to the national territory of the High Contracting Party concerned" and




ertheless, Bankovi6 still preserved an extraterritorial scope for obligations
under the Convention broader than the United States government had
recognized for aliens abroad prior to Boumediene. The Bankovie court re-
affirmed that "effective control" of a territory through military occupa-
tion could give rise to obligations under the Convention for the acts of
both the state's officials and the subordinate local administration. And
the court recognized extraterritorial jurisdiction over the acts of a state's
consulates and embassies, and on ships and aircraft. The government
respondents in the case conceded that, under traditional rules of public
international law, jurisdiction could arise from "the assertion or exercise
of legal authority, actual or purported," over persons brought within the
state's control, and that the arrest and detention of persons by a state's
military authorities on foreign soil was a "classic exercise of such legal
authority."18 1 Bankovie, therefore, did not seem to affect the court's prior
holdings recognizing jurisdiction, inter alia, over cases involving a state's
extraterritorial arrest and detention of an individual.
Subsequent decisions have reaffirmed and perhaps broadened this
approach to extraterritoriality. In Ocalan v. Turkey, the European Court
found that Turkey's arrest and forced extradition of a Turkish national
from within Kenya had triggered rights under the Convention.' 8 2 The
court found that the applicant was within Turkish jurisdiction immedi-
ately upon being taken into the custody of Turkish officials, "even
though . .. Turkey exercised its authority outside its territory."1 8 3 It am-
biguously distinguished Bankovie on the grounds that "the applicant was
physically forced to return to Turkey by Turkish officials and was subject
to their authority and control following his arrest and return to
Turkey."18 4
Issa v. Turkey, which was decided by a Chamber of the ECHR while
Al-Skeini was pending in the lower U.K courts, applied the "effective con-
trol" standard to reaffirm that acts in a foreign state that are committed
by agents under a State's "authority and control" may trigger the applica-
tion of the ECHR, even outside the legal space of the Council of Europe:
[A] state may also be held accountable for violation of the Con-
vention rights and freedoms of persons who are in the territory
of another state but who are found to be under the former
state's authority and control through its agents operating-
whether lawfully or unlawfully-in the latter state.' 8 5
Issa involved kidnappings and deaths allegedly resulting from a six-
week invasion of northern Iraq by 35,000 Turkish forces. Returning once
again to a conception of jurisdiction as control, rather than as lawful au-
thority to regulate, the court recognized that, for jurisdiction to exist, a
181. Banhovid, 2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. at 346.
182. Ocalan v. Turkey, 2005-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 131.
183. Id. at 164.
184. Id.
185. Issa v. Turkey, App. No. 31821/96, 41 Eur. H.R. Rep. 567, 588 (2004).
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State need not exercise "detailed control over the policies and actions of
the authorities in the area" situated, but need only be in "overall control
of the area." 18 6 The court invoked the jurisprudence of the Human
Rights Committee to hold that the Convention should not be "inter-
preted so as to allow a State party to perpetrate violations of the
Convention on the territory of another State, which it could not perpe-
trate on its own territory."' 8 7 The applicants in Issa ultimately did not
prevail because they could not demonstrate sufficiently that Turkish
forces were actually operating in their area.' 8 8 But the clear implication
from Issa was that the extraterritorial conduct of a state's military person-
nel could trigger Convention obligations in situations under the effective
control of those personnel, even if they did not have effective control
over the territory. Most recently, in Medvedyev v. France,'8 9 a Chamber of
the European Court found that the seizure of a drug trafficking vessel on
the high seas without legal justification violated Article 5 of the European
Convention.
2. Al-Skeini. - The claims in Al-Skeini involved six civilians killed by
British forces in southern Iraq. Four of them had been killed either at
British checkpoints, by British forces searching a private home, or on the
streets by British patrols.o9 0 The British military had concluded that in
each case, an adequate threat was posed to justify the use of lethal force.
The sixth case involved the death of Mr. Mousa in a British detention
facility, described in the Introduction. The questions posed by the case
included whether, after Bankovie, the "effective control" test applied
outside of the territory of the members of Council of Europe. (The
ECHR's post-Bankovi6 decisions appear to counsel that it does.) The U.K.
courts at all three levels found that the first five deaths did not occur
within U.K "jurisdiction" under the Convention, but that the case of Mr.
Mousa did.
The British government disputed jurisdiction over Mr. Mousa's case
in the lowest administrative court. That court nevertheless found jurisdic-
186. Id.
187. Id. (citing Human Rights Comm., L6pez Burgos, supra note 116; Human Rights
Comm., Casariego, supra note 116).
188. Id. at 590.
189. App. No. 3394/03, 1 50 (Eur. Ct. H.R. July 10, 2008) (referred to Grand
Chamber Dec. 1, 2008), at http://www.echr.coe.int/ECHR/EN/Header/Case-Law/
HUDOC/HUDOC+database/ (follow "HUDOC" hyperlink; input "3394/03" in
"Application Number" field; press search; follow "Case of Medyedev" hyperlink) (on file
with the Columbia Law Review) (noting ship and its crew were under control of French
military forces from time of capture, "so that even though they were outside French
territory, they were within the jurisdiction of France for the purposes of Article 1 of the
Convention").
190. R (Al-Skeini and others) v. Sec'y of State for Def., [2007] UKHL 26, [2008] 1
A.C. 153 (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.). Another decedent had been killed in her home
by a stray bullet. The British military disputed that the bullet had come from a British
weapon. Id. 1 6, 1 A.C. at 177.
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tion.19 The court read Bankovie as significantly narrowing the scope of
extraterritorial jurisdiction under the Convention, and rejected the
broader language from the later decision in Issa as inconsistent with
Bankovie. Following Bankovics lead, the court relied upon traditional in-
ternational principles of prescriptive jurisdiction, rather than jurisdiction
as control, to define the scope of the Convention. The court nevertheless
concluded that Mr. Mousa's death in a British military prison was suffi-
ciently analogous to the narrow exceptions recognized in Banovie for the
extraterritorial actions of embassy and consulate personnel and actions
on airplanes and ships for jurisdiction to be present. The court appeared
to restrict its holding to the facts of the case:
[I]t is not at all straining the examples of extraterritorial juris-
diction ... to hold that a British military prison, operating in
Iraq with the consent of the Iraqi sovereign authorities, and con-
taining arrested suspects, falls within even a narrowly limited ex-
ception exemplified by embassies, consulates, vessels and air-
craft, and . . . a prison. 19 2
The court could "see no reason in international law considerations,
nor in principle, why in such circumstances the United Kingdom should
not be answerable" under the Convention.19 3 On appeal, the govern-
ment accepted this narrow understanding of agency jurisdiction, but ar-
gued that no remedy was available in the U.K. courts because the Human
Rights Act had not implemented domestically any extraterritorial obliga-
tions under the Convention.
The Law Lords affirmed both the dismissal of the first five cases and
the recognition ofjurisdiction over the case of Mr. Mousa.194 In address-
ing the presumption against territorial application of the Human Rights
Act, Lord Rodger observed that a state ordinarily could not assert its au-
thority over the subjects of another sovereign in a foreign state, for rea-
sons both of comity and practicality.1 9 5 The assertion of legal obligations
over the state's own agents abroad, however, was a different matter, since
"[i]nternational law does not prevent a state from exercising jurisdiction
over its nationals travelling or residing abroad," if the legislation "does
not offend against the sovereignty of other states."e9 6 Consistent with
classical prescriptive jurisdiction, he observed that making remedies avail-
able under the Convention for the acts of U.K authorities in another
state's territory would not offend the sovereignty of the other state and
thus did not offend any aspect of international law.19 7 This approach
191. R (Al-Skeini and others) v. Sec'y of State for Def., [2004] EWIHC (Admin) 2911,
(2005) 2 W.L.R 1401 (Eng.).
192. Id. 1 287, 2 W.L.R. at 1483.
193. Id.
194. Al-Skeini, [2008] 1 A.C. at 154 (syllabus).
195. Id. 45-46, 1 A.C. at 192-93 (Rodger, Lord).
196. Id. 46, 1 A.C. at 193 (Rodger, Lord) (citing Oppenheim's International Law,
supra note 26, § 138).
197. Id. 54, 1 A.C. at 195.
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would not result in "conferl[ring] rights on people all over the world with
little or no real conne [ct]ion with the United Kingdom," since Conven-
tion rights would only arise for persons "within [U.K.] jurisdiction."' 98
With respect to the scope of extraterritorial jurisdiction under the
Convention, Lord Rodger maintained that the critical question was "the
link between the victim and the contracting state."'39 He concluded that
under either Bankovie or Issa, British forces exercised insufficient control
in Basra to trigger jurisdiction in the first five cases. Lord Carswell agreed
with Rodger's analysis on this point, but emphasized how "stringent" the
test was for extraterritorial jurisdiction. 200 Because such jurisdiction was
"pro tanto a diminution or invasion" of the sovereignty of another state,
extraterritorial jurisdiction "should be closely confined." 20 1 Once one
went beyond the categories of embassies, consulates, and a military prison
that was occupied and controlled by U.K. agents in Iraq, he would re-
quire "a high degree of control by the agents of the state" before recog-
nizing jurisdiction in another state's territory. 20 2
The preceding examination of the approaches of international and
regional human rights tribunals to extraterritorial conduct reveals sub-
stantial consensus regarding basic principles. Whether one employs the
"authority and control" test of the Inter-American system, the "power or
effective control" standard of the Human Rights Committee and the
International Court ofJustice, the "de facto and dejure effective control"
of the Committee Against Torture-all of which apply to control over
either persons or territories, the "effective control" test of the Interna-
tional Court of Justice, or the more territorially-constrained conception
of "control" of the ECHR, control, rather than geography, is the touch-
stone for the recognition of rights protections abroad.
Concededly, the interpretation of regional and international human
rights treaties may be imperfect evidence of what international law allows
or requires regarding the application of domestic legal constraints on the
exercise of state power abroad. Interpreting 'jurisdiction" in human
rights treaties requires consideration of both jurisdictional concepts
under international law and the text and purpose of the specific human
rights treaty, and may require consideration of the treaty's negotiating
history and subsequent state practice. In other words, any particular
treaty framework may impose its own endogenous constraints on the
meaning ofjurisdiction. For example, the European Convention was cre-
ated based on the assumption of common values shared by a particular
198. Id. 1 55, 1 A.C. at 195 (internal quotation marks omitted).
199. Id. 64, 1 A.C. at 197.





regional community, and has textual provisions (such as Article 56) that
appear to support a territorially restrictive view of jurisdiction. Bankovi
and Al-Skeini accordingly may reflect a more limited scope of extraterrito-
rial jurisdiction based on control than customary international law would
acknowledge.
But each of the tribunals addressed above to a significant extent was
also construing 'jurisdiction" as a concept of international law, whether
from the perspective of control and state responsibility, or prescriptive
jurisdiction. Their approaches confirm that contemporary international
law does not prohibit a state from regulating the conduct of its agents
abroad, through constitutional limitations or otherwise, if it ever did.
Certainly nothing in modern international law principles of jurisdiction,
prescriptive or otherwise, justified the formalistic territorial limitations
imposed on the extraterritorial application of constitutional rights that
the U.S. government sought to reaffirm in Boumediene.
V. BOUMEDIENE AND MUNA. RESURRECTING THE
EVOLUTIONARY APPROACH
The decisions in Boumediene and Munaf upholding the application of
constitutional and statutory habeas corpus abroad retreated from two en-
trenched nineteenth-century principles-territorial sovereignty and citi-
zenship-that had plagued U.S. extraterritoriality doctrine. Boumediene
addressed the question of whether the Suspension Clause protected
habeas corpus jurisdiction for aliens being detained as enemy combatants
in GuantAnamo Bay, a territory outside the formal sovereign territory of
the United States, but subject to the United States's "complete jurisdic-
tion and control." Munaf addressed whether statutory habeas jurisdiction
applied to a U.S. citizen held by multinational forces in Iraq, but who
remained under the United States's effective control. Together, the deci-
sions substantially reoriented the U.S. extraterritoriality doctrine toward a
functional, control-based test. At the same time, they potentially opened
U.S. doctrine toward an evolutionary relationship to international law.
Justice Kennedy's majority opinion in Boumediene rejected the U.S.
government's argument that the Constitution's geographic scope vis-a-vis
aliens is limited to the formal sovereign territory-that the Constitution
"stops where dejure sovereignty ends."203 justice Kennedy portrayed the
Court's prior extraterritoriality decisions, including In re Ross, the Insular
Cases, Johnson v. Eisentrager, Reid v. Covert, and his own prior concurring
opinion in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, as establishing a "functional
approach" to the Constitution's application abroad.20 4
The "common thread" uniting these cases, according to Kennedy,
was "the idea that questions of extraterritoriality turn on objective factors
203. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2253 (2008).
204. Id. at 2258.
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and practical concerns, not formalism."205 Kennedy read the cases as al-
lowing the Court "to inquire into the objective degree of control the
Nation asserts over foreign territory."206 He cited the leading Insular de-
cision, Downes v. Bidwell, for the proposition that the application of a con-
stitutional provision abroad depends on "the situation of the territory and
its relations to the United States." 207 The Insular Cases thus held that only
"fundamental" constitutional provisions applied to the unincorporated
territories acquired during the Spanish-American War because the Su-
preme Court recognized the need to adapt the Constitution to circum-
stances where the United States only planned to govern temporarily,
where U.S. legal procedures were alien to a population previously gov-
erned under a civil law system, and where completely displacing the ex-
isting legal system could risk "uncertainty and instability."2 08 The Insular
Cases thus "not[ed] the inherent practical difficulties of enforcing all con-
stitutional provisions 'always and everywhere.'"
209
Likewise, Justice Kennedy continued, at least for concurring Justices
Harlan and Frankfurter in Reid v. Covert, the determinative issue in up-
holding the extraterritorial application of grand and petit jury protec-
tions for U.S. citizens was not citizenship, but "practical considerations,
related . . . to the place of their confinement and trial." 210 Kennedy
quoted Justice Harlan for the proposition that "the particular local set-
ting, the practical necessities, and the possible alternatives are relevant
to . . . whether jury trial should be deemed" necessary2 1' and, in particu-
lar, whether judicial enforcement of the provision would be "impractica-
ble and anomalous." 2 12 The critical difference between the applications
of petit and grand jury rights in Reid and their denial in In re Ross there-
fore was the "practical considerations" in Reid "that made jury trial a
more feasible option."2 1 3
Similarly, the central issue justifying the denial of habeas review to
the enemy aliens in Eisentrager was not citizenship or extraterritoriality,
but the joint Allied control over the Landsberg prison. Sovereignty, as
205. Id.
206. Id. at 2252.
207. Id. at 2254 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Downes v. Bidwell, 182
U.S. 244, 293 (1901) (White, J., concurring)).
208. Id.
209. Id. at 2255 (quoting Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 312 (1922)); see also id.
at 2254-55 ("[T]he real issue in the Insular Cases was . . . which [constitutional] provisions
were applicable [to the government] . . . in dealing with new conditions and
requirements." (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Balzac, 258 U.S. at 312)).
210. Id. at 2256.
211. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 75
(1957) (Harlan,J., concurring in the result)).
212. Id. at 2255-56 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Reid, 354 U.S. at 75
(Harlan,J., concurring in the result)).
213. Id. at 2257; see also id. at 2256 (noting Reid concurring justices preserved the
holding in In re Ross, which they understood as holding "under some circumstances
Americans abroad have no right to indictment and trial by jury").
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used in Eisentrager, was "a multifaceted concept,"2 14 which referred to
something akin to the international law idea of jurisdiction as control.
Sovereignty accordingly referred to "the objective degree of control the
United States asserted" over the facility,2 15 or "plenary control, or practi-
cal sovereignty," rather than "de jure sovereignty."2 16 Justice Kennedy
quoted the international law conception of sovereignty as "a state's lawful
control over its territory generally to the exclusion of other states, author-
ity to govern in that territory, and authority to apply law there."2 17 Fur-
thermore, Kennedy suggested that the relevant problem of "control" in
postwar Germany extended beyond the multilateral control of the prison
itself. The United States's temporary occupation in Germany covered
57,000 square miles of territory and eighteen million people. The United
States was responsible for supervising "massive reconstruction and aid ef-
forts," and faced potential security threats from the defeated enemy.2 18
Kennedy observed that "[t] he Court's holding in Eisentrager was thus con-
sistent with the Insular Cases, where it had held there was no need to
extend full constitutional protections to territories the United States did
not intend to govern indefinitely."2 19 This was not an indefinite occupa-
tion of the type that the Human Rights Committee and the ICJ have
found subjects Israel to full legal accountability in the Occupied
Territories. It was temporary, like the United States's temporary occupa-
tion of Cuba after the Spanish-American War in Neely, but with potential
security threats more like those facing the British forces in Al-Skeini. By
contrast, GuantAnamo Bay is "no transient possession";2 20 the United
States exercises de facto sovereignty over Guantinamo Bay by virtue of its
complete jurisdiction and control there.
Kennedy also found that functional concerns involving control had
always informed the right to habeas corpus. In England, habeas corpus
jurisdiction historically might not have run to certain territories due to
such "prudential concerns" as whether a court's jurisdiction would "con-
flict with the judgments of another court of competent jurisdiction" or
whether courts, as a practical matter, might be unable to enforce their
judgments due to the great distance. 22 1 Similarly, habeas might not ex-
tend where a court would be disobeyed; where another nation's court
214. Id. at 2257.
215. Id. at 2258.
216. Id. at 2252.
217. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Restatement (Third) of Foreign
Relations Law of the United States § 206 cmt. b (1986)).
218. Id. at 2261.
219. Id. at 2260-61.
220. Id. at 2261.
221. Id. at 2250 ("[P]rudential concerns . . . such as comity and the orderly
administration of criminal justice affect the appropriate exercise of habeas jurisdiction."




had jurisdiction; where another nation's laws applied;2 22 or where, as in
Eisentrager, there were difficulties involved in producing the petition-
ers.223 Accordingly, for purposes of extraterritorial application of habeas
corpus, the majority found the following considerations relevant: "(1)
the citizenship and status of the detainee and the adequacy of the process
through which that status determination was made; (2) the nature of the
sites where apprehension and then detention took place; and (3) the
practical obstacles inherent in resolving the prisoner's entitlement to the
writ."224 The majority stressed the practical reality that the Guantinamo
Bay detainees had spent six years under U.S. control with no meaningful
legal oversight in a territory where U.S. law has been the only law for over
a century.2 2 5
Although some commentators have attempted to read Boumediene as
limiting extraterritorial application of the Constitution to Guantinamo
or to territories over which the U.S. exercises complete jurisdiction or de
facto sovereignty, the opinion cannot be cabined in this manner. Noth-
ing in the three-factor test for habeas corpus indicates that de facto con-
trol is required. The decision in Reid, which Kennedy found fully consis-
tent with his analysis, upheld criminal procedural protections on U.S.
military bases abroad and did not turn on the type of complete control
over territory that the United States exercises at Guantinamo. Likewise,
the presence or absence of "complete" territorial control or de facto sov-
ereignty were not the relevant reasons for denying criminal procedural
protections in U.S. consular courts abroad in In re Ross, or on sovereign
U.S. territory in the Insular Cases. Indeed, an argument that would have
made constitutional habeas corpus applicable outside the United States
only at Guantinamo, as a territory uniquely subject to U.S. de facto sover-
eignty, was presented to the Court in an amicus brief joined by this au-
thor, but was not embraced by the Court.22 6
Boumediene requires a more modulated analysis of control, and looks
to the full range of practical implications for application of a particular
constitutional right that arises from whatever degree of control the
United States exercises in a particular context. The decision does not
provide much guidance regarding how a "practical control" test should
be applied for constitutional rights other than habeas corpus, but some
rough guidelines are offered. The decision portrays control as spanning
a spectrum, at least for the purposes of the application of the Suspension
Clause. De jure2 2 7 and de facto sovereignty lie at one end of the spec-
222. Id. at 2251.
223. Id. at 2257.
224. Id. at 2259.
225. Id. at 2275.
226. Brief of Professors of Constitutional Law and Federal Jurisdiction as Amici
Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 1-2, Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (Nos. 06-1195 & 06-
1196).
227. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2258 (de jure sovereignty "affects, at least to some
extent, the political branches' control over that territory").
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trum (although even dejure sovereignty by one state may not include de
facto control-a situation starkly illustrated by the respective roles of
Cuba and the United States over GuantAnamo Bay).228 Control that is
"absolute" and "indefinite" also weighs in favor of constitutional protec-
tion, as does a situation where the United States intends a long-term oc-
cupation or intends to displace all local legal institutions.2 2 9 On the
other hand, in a situation where control is multilateral, where the United
States is "answerable to its Allies for all activities occurring there,"2 30
where the location is in an active theater of war,2 31 or where security is
uncertain, adequate control may not be present. Additional factors to be
considered may include the potential for compromising a military mis-
sion,232 the function of U.S. authority in a location, the size of the terri-
tory and population under U.S. authority, the compatibility of U.S. legal
standards with local law, the potential for friction with a host govern-
ment, and the potential for conflicting jurisdiction.
Boumediene's rejection of formal territorial restrictions and citizen-
ship requirements, and its focus on practical control for determining
when constitutional rights limit governmental conduct abroad, largely
comport with modern international law's focus on effective control. The
Court did not explicitly rely on the effective control decisions of human
rights tribunals, although these authorities were presented to the Court
by the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights as amicus. 233 Never-
theless, the decision broke with the nineteenth-century concept of juris-
diction, largely brought U.S. doctrine in line with the international view
that effective control establishes a state's legal accountability for harms
committed abroad, and opened the door for future development of ex-
traterritoriality doctrine in a direction consistent with international law.
Boumediene thus may be considered a reassertion of an evolutionary
approach to international law in the Court's jurisprudence regarding ex-
traterritoriality. Of course, it is possible that the Court simply stumbled
upon a formula for determining extraterritoriality that appeared to paral-
lel international rules, but that the Court did so for its own, purely do-
mestic reasons. Perhaps more likely, the Court, which had the interna-
tional law decisions before it, preferred not to explicitly link the test it
articulated to international doctrine. The fact that the Court did not cite
international law, however, does not preclude the doctrine from being
informed by international law or from evolving with international law in
the future. As both Judith Resnik and Rosalind Dixon have observed,
228. See id. at 2252 ("Indeed, it is not altogether uncommon for a territory to be
under the de jure sovereignty of one nation, while under the plenary control, or practical
sovereignty, of another.").
229. Id. at 2260.
230. Id. (citing Hirota v. MacArthur, 338 U.S. 197, 198 (1948)).
231. Id. at 2262.
232. Id. at 2261.
233. Brief of Amicus Curiae United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights in
Support of Petitioners at 5-16, Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (Nos. 06-1195 & 06-1196).
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courts often engage in "silent dialogues" or "co-evolution" in the transna-
tional migration and development of legal principles.2 34 As Harold Koh
contends, such dialogues may result in the development of "different la-
bels" or "parallel rules" for the same underlying principles.2 3 5 The criti-
cal point for now is that a doctrine that had been entrenched in a rigid
nineteenth-century conception of territorial jurisdiction, at least with re-
spect to extraterritorial constitutional protection for aliens, has been lib-
erated from that stricture in a manner consistent with modern jurispru-
dence regarding the extraterritorial rights of citizens under the U.S.
Constitution and the extraterritorial obligations of states under interna-
tional law.
Concededly, the Boumediene decision does not reach as broadly as
those of the human rights bodies, in that it focuses on control over territo-
ries (occupied Cuba in Neely, occupied Germany in Eisentrager, the Insular
territories), facilities (Landsberg Prison in Eisentrager, the military bases in
Reid), and proceedings (the consular tribunal in In re Ross, the military tri-
als in Reid). The decision does not specifically address control that is
exercised over people (such as in the context of international kidnappings,
or extraterritorial abuse of detainees). In this sense, it does not reach as
broadly as the decisions under international and regional human rights
instruments.
The companion decision in Munaf v. Geren, however, did address the
question of extraterritorial control over an individual, albeit in the con-
text of application of the federal habeas statute.2 3 6 The Court's prag-
matic approach based on de facto control again mirrors an international
law analysis. Munaf addressed whether the federal habeas statute estab-
lished federal courtjurisdiction over two U.S. citizens, Mr. Munaf and Mr.
Omar, who were detained by U.S. forces acting as part of the
Multinational Force-Iraq (MNF-I), in Iraq.2 3 7 The case thus posed the
234. Rosalind Dixon, A Democratic Theory of Constitutional Comparison, 56 Am. J.
Comp. L. 947, 960-63 (2008) (" [I]n an increasingly globalized world, constitutional
democracies which start with sufficient commonality in a particular constitutional area are
very likely to experience a co-evolution in constitutional values."); Judith Resnik, Law's
Migration: American Exceptionalism, Silent Dialogues, and Federalism's Multiple Ports of
Entry, 115 Yale L.J. 1564, 1612-26 (2006) (identifying "implicit dialogues" as "silent
absorption" of international norms by domestic courts without explicit reference to an
international source).
235. See Harold Hongju Koh, Foreword: On American Exceptionalism, 55 Stan. L.
Rev. 1479, 1483-84 (2003) (discussing United States's use of "different labels" for same
underlying principles as found in international law); Harold Hongju Koh, International
Law as Part of Our Law, 98 Am J. Int'l L. 43, 45 (2004) (discussing development of
"parallel rules" between U.S. and foreign jurisprudence in which "the Court has noted
when American legal rules seem to parallel those of other nations").
236. Munaf v. Geren, 128 S. Ct. 2207, 2218 (2008) (addressing "question whether
United States district courts may exercise their habeas jurisdiction to enjoin our Armed
Forces from transferring individuals detained within another sovereign's territory to that
sovereign's government for criminal prosecution").
237. Id. at 2213.
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question whether the detainees could be considered "in custody
under ... the authority of the United States" for purposes of the federal
habeas statute. 2 38
As described by the Court, the MNF-I was an international coalition
of twenty-six nations, including the United States, operating in Iraq
under the unified command of the United States military, at the request
of the Iraqi government, and pursuant to U.N. Security Council resolu-
tions. 239 Pursuant to an agreement with the Iraqi government, MNF-I
forces were authorized to detain individuals believed to pose a threat to
Iraqi security, and to continue to detain such persons during Iraqi crimi-
nal proceedings. MNF-I detention operations were overseen by an
American military unit, under the command of the U.S. military. At the
time of the decision, MNF-I forces were holding approximately 24,000
detainees at Camp Cropper and elsewhere. 240
Omar and Munaf were detained as security internees pursuant to the
decision of MNF-I tribunals composed of three American military of-
ficers, consistent with Article 5 of the (Third) Geneva Convention.
Omar's decision was then sustained by a Combined Review and Release
Board, comprised of six representatives of the Iraqi government and
three MNF-I officers. His habeas petition sought to challenge his transfer
to Iraqi custody for trial before the Iraqi courts.24 1 Munaf was prosecuted
before an Iraqi court while in U.S. custody, and was awaiting further pro-
ceedings when his habeas petition was filed.2 42
The U.S. government maintained that because the United States was
acting as an agent for a multinational force, the Court should follow the
decision in Hirota v. MacArthu 4 3 to hold that habeas jurisdiction was not
available. 244 Hirota involved high level Japanese military personnel who
were convicted by the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, a
tribunal established and overseen by General MacArthur for the Allies.
In a three-paragraph opinion, the Supreme Court found that habeas re-
view was not appropriate, since the military tribunal was "not a tribunal of
the United States" and General MacArthur was acting "as the agent of the
Allied Powers." 24 5
In rejecting the government's claim that the multinational coalition
should defeat a finding of control, the Munaf Court again privileged
functionalism over formalism. Writing for a unanimous Court, Chief
Justice Roberts examined the actual nature of U.S. control over the MNF-
238. 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (c) (1), (3) (2006).
239. Munaf, 128 S. Ct. at 2213.
240. Id. at 2213-14.
241. Id. at 2214.
242. Id. at 2215.
243. 338 U.S. 197 (1948).
244. See Munaf, 128 S. Ct. at 2217 ("The Government argues that the multinational
character of the MNF-I, like the multinational character of the tribunal at issue in Hirota,
means that it too is not a United States entity subject to habeas.").
245. Hirota, 338 U.S. at 198.
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I, and especially noted the government's concession that Omar and
Munaf were "in the immediate 'physical custody' of American soldiers
who answer[ed] only to an American chain of command," 246 and whose
actions were controlled, "'[a]s a practical matter,"' by "'the President
and the Pentagon." 2 47 Because the United States had authority to re-
lease the detainees without the consent of other countries, the Court
found that they were "in custody" of the United States within the mean-
ing of the habeas statute. 248 The Court concluded that "actual custody"
sufficed for purposes of habeas jurisdiction, "even if that custody could be
viewed as 'under . . . color of another authority, such as the MNF-I," at
least for American citizens. 249 Whatever may have been the reality of U.S.
authority over General MacArthur, the Hirota Court had relied on the
Solicitor General's representation that MacArthur "did not serve 'under
the Joint Chiefs of Staff.' "250 Hirota was thus distinguishable. 251
The pragmatic factual inquiry into the nature of extraterritorial U.S.
control over the individuals in Munaf bears striking similarity to the
British courts' analysis of U.K control over the British detention facility
in Iraq,252 as well as the analysis of the various international tribunals in
situations where a state exercises extraterritorial power over a specific in-
dividual.2 53 Although the Court did not couch its inquiry in terms of
effective control, its analysis sought to determine whether the United
States's control over the detainees was effective as a practical matter, de-
spite U.S. participation in the multilateral operation.
Moreover, both Munaf and Hirota share striking parallels with recent
decisions of international bodies holding that states do not incur legal
responsibility for harms committed by their troops when their troops are
participating in multilateral peacekeeping or other operations under
multilateral control or U.N. command. The general principle in such
contexts, as stated by the International Law Commission, is that the "con-
duct of an organ of a state . . . that is placed at the disposal of [an]
246. Munaf, 128 S. Ct. at 2216 (quoting Brief for the Respondents at 21, Munaf, 128 S.
Ct. 2207 (No. 06-1666)).
247. Id. (quoting Transcript of Oral Argument at 15, Munaf, 128 S. Ct. 2207 (No. 06-
1666)).
248. Id. at 2217.
249. Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (c) (1) (2006)).
250. Id. at 2217-18 (quoting Transcript of Oral Argument at 42, 50, 51, Hirota, 338
U.S. 197 (No. 239)).
251. Munaf also submitted a petition to the Human Rights Committee against
Romania, alleging that Romania shared responsibility for his mistreatment by transferring
him to U.S. military custody in Iraq. The Committee dismissed the petition on the
grounds that the harms alleged by Munaf in U.S. custody were not "the necessary and
foreseeable consequence" of his transfer and that Romania thus did not "exercise
jurisdiction over the author in a way that exposed him to a real risk of becoming a victim of
any violations under the Covenant." U.N. Human Rights Comm., Views, Communication
No. 1539/2006, 11 7.5, 14.6, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/96/D/1539/2006 (Aug. 21, 2009).
252. See supra Part IV.D.2 (discussing Al-Skeini case).
253. See supra Part IV.C (discussing International Court of Justice).
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international organization shall be considered under international law an
act of the latter organization if the organization exercises effective control
over that conduct."25 4 Where the state retains some control over its na-
tional contingent, the decisive question in establishing legal responsibility
for particular conduct is whether an "organization exercises effective con-
trol over th[e] conduct" in question.2 5 5
In Behrami and Saramati,256 the ECHR applied this principle to hold
that France was not responsible for the conduct of its troops as part of a
U.N. peacekeeping operation in Kosovo. The Behramis contended that
France was responsible for the death and injury of two children after
French forces failed to clear an undetonated cluster bomb.25 7 Mr.
Saramati complained that he had been unlawfully detained for six
months at the hands of French officers. 25 8 The ECHR concluded that
because the peacekeeping organs were either subsidiary organs of the
U.N. or exercising powers lawfully delegated by the Security Council,
their actions were attributable to the U.N., not to France. 259
On the other hand, in Al-Jedda v. UK Secretary of State for Defence,26 0 a
majority of the U.K. Law Lords rejected the United Kingdom's attempt to
attribute the conduct of U.K. forces in Iraq to the United Nations. The
factual circumstances closely paralleled those in Munaf-the case in-
volved a challenge under the European Convention to the allegedly arbi-
trary detention of a British national who was being held as a security de-
tainee in British-policed Basra. As Lord Bingham of Cornhill reasoned,
there had been no suggestion that the U.N. controlled or was responsible
for the abuses by U.S. troops at Abu Ghraib or the abuses by U.K. forces
at issue in Al-Skeini, and this situation was no different:
The UN did not dispatch the coalition forces to Iraq. The
[Coalition Provisional Authority] was established by the coali-
tion states, notably the US, not the UN. When the coalition
states became occupying powers in Iraq they had no UN man-
date.... [T] he UN gave the multi-national force express author-
ity to take steps to promote security and stability in Iraq, but ...
the Security Council was not delegating its power by empower-
ing the UK to exercise its function but was authorising the UK to
carry out functions it could not perform itself. At no time did
the US or the UK disclaim responsibility for the conduct of their
forces or the UN accept it. It cannot realistically be said that US
and UK forces were under the effective command and control
254. Int'l Law Comm'n, Responsibility of International Organizations, art. 5, U.N.
Doc. A/CN.4/L.648 (May 27, 2004) (emphasis added).
255. Id.
256. Behrami v. France, Eur. Ct. H.R. App. Nos. 71412/01 & 78166/01 (Grand
Chamber, sitting May 2, 2007), reprinted in 46 I.L.M. 746 (2007).
257. Id. 5-6, 46 I.L.M. at 748.
258. Id. 8-13, 46 I.L.M. at 748-49.
259. Id. 151-52, 46 I.L.M. at 773.
260. [2007] UKHL 58, [2008] 1 A.C. 332 (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.).
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of the UN, or that UK forces were under such command and
control when they detained the appellant.2 6 1
Like Boumediene, the Munaf Court did not acknowledge the Al-Jedda
decision, although the case had been brought to the Court's attention in
amicus briefs. 26 2 Both Munaf and AI-Jedda applied an effective control
test and reached the same conclusions regarding the respective control
exercised by U.S. and British forces in Iraq.26 3
VI. EMBEDDING EFFECTIVE CONTROL
The appropriate scope of a state's extraterritorial obligations is le-
gally unresolved at this time, both as a matter of international law and of
U.S. constitutional law. The full implications of the Boumediene decision
and the ultimate parameters of an effective control test-including its
application to persons versus territories, and under what circumstances-
remain subjects for future development. Nevertheless, Boumediene and
Munaf appear to leave the door somewhat open to considering effective
control in the international sense in determining the functional applica-
bility of constitutional provisions to conduct abroad. But how would an
approach to extraterritorial application of the Constitution that consid-
ered effective control operate in practice? In his dissent in Boumediene,
Justice Scalia criticized the majority's functional test for determining the
Constitution's application to conduct abroad as "inherently subjec-
tive."2 64 Other commentators, both before the decision and since, have
expressed doubt regarding the malleability of a test that turns on whether
application of the Constitution would be "impracticable and anomalous"
in a particular context.26 5 Deciding whether states adequately control
261. Id. 1 23, 1 A.C. at 348-49. (Bingham, Lord). The Law Lords in Al-Jedda
ultimately proceeded, however, to hold that U.N. Security Counsel Resolution 1546,
authorizing "internment ... necessary for imperative reasons of security," displaced the
ECHR art. 5(1) prohibition on arbitrary detention. Id. 39, 1 A.C. at 355.
262. Brief of Former U.S. Diplomats and Nat'1 Security Specialists as Amici Curiae in
Support of Respondents at 18 n.24, 23-24, Munaf v. Geren, 129 S. Ct. 19 (2008) (Nos. 07-
394 & 06-1666).
263. For additional recent cases exploring state responsibility in cooperation with
multilateral institutions, see Galic v. The Netherlands, App. No. 22617/07, 46 (Eur. Ct.
H.R. June 9, 2009), available at http://www.echr.coe.int/ECHR/EN/Header/Case-Law/
HUDOC/HUDOC+database/ (follow "HUDOC" hyperlink; check the "Decisions" box on
left sidebar; input "22617/07" in "Application Number" field; press search; follow "Galic v.
The Netherlands" hyperlink) (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (finding Netherlands
was not responsible for acts or omissions of International Criminal Tribunal for former
Yugoslavia, in light of tribunal's status as subsidiary organ of U.N.); Blagojevic v. The
Netherlands, App. No. 49032/07, 1 46 (Eur. Ct. H.R. June 9, 2009), available at http://
www.echr.coe.int/ECHR/EN/Header/Case-Law/HUDOC/HUDOC+database/ (follow
"HUDOC" hyperlink; check the "Decisions" box on left sidebar; input "49032/07" in
"Application Number" field; press search; follow "Blagojevic v. The Netherlands"
hyperlink) (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (same).
264. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2303 (2008) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
265. Christina Duffy Burnett, A Convenient Constitution? Extraterritoriality After
Boumediene, 109 Colum. L. Rev. 973, 976 (2009) (arguing Court's functional approach
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complex events occurring abroad is not easy, particularly where their acts
are intermixed with those of other states. A pragmatic test that requires
looking at the totality of the circumstances no doubt is unsatisfying to
those who crave bright-line rules. But the effective control decisions of
other national courts2 66 and international tribunals demonstrate both
that courts are capable of applying such a standard, and that workable
principles are available. An effective control standard does not mean that
every action abroad gives rise to human rights or constitutional law obli-
gations.267 While complete answers are premature, this Part accordingly
suggests some preliminary considerations for application of an effective
control test in constitutional extraterritorial analysis.
Like other courts adopting the effective control approach, the
Supreme Court's decisions in Boumediene and Munaf distinguished the
situations before the Court from World War II prisons under multilateral
control or tribunals that were not subject to ultimate U.S. authority. As
detailed previously, other international, regional, and national tribunals
also have applied the effective control test to find that states lack legal
responsibility when they do not, as a practical matter, control the events
around them, whether as a result of participating in peacekeeping opera-
tions not under their own command, or due to highly unstable security
situations, such as those U.K. forces faced in trying to police the streets of
Basra in occupied Iraq.
Boumediene's functional approach to the application of habeas corpus
to Guantinamo Bay does not preclude the possibility that in some cases,
application of the Constitution in overseas contexts would be unwork-
able, overbroad, and would wreak havoc with U.S. governmental obliga-
tions abroad. As Justice Jackson put it provocatively in Eisentrager
Such a construction [that the Constitution applies to aliens
abroad] would mean that during military occupation irreconcil-
able enemy elements, guerrilla fighters, and "werewolves" could
enables "courts to make decisions respecting the applicability . . . of constitutional
provisions abroad based entirely on policy concerns"); see also Neuman, Strangers to the
Constitution, supra note 52, at 113-17 (characterizing impracticable and anomalous test as
form of "global due process"). But see Gerald L. Neuman, The Extraterritorial
Constitution After Boumediene v. Bush, 82 S. Cal. L. Rev. 259, 259, 273 (2009) (identifying
"impracticable and anomalous test" as "best fit ... [with] the Court's modern case law" and
noting that although test "suffers from [a] lack of certainty," alternatives may not be
superior); Gerald L. Neuman, Understanding Global Due Process, 23 Geo. Immigr. L.J.
365, 370 (2009) (discussing, pre-Boumediene, implications of "impracticable and
anomalous" approach for constitutional rights of aliens abroad).
266. See Chimine I. Keitner, Rights Beyond Borders (Oct. 2, 2009), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1480886 (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Columbia
Law Review) (examining approach to extraterritorial application of domestic rights under
various national legal systems).
267. Nor, in U.S. law, does it mean that a remedy is invariably available. See Rasul v.
Myers, 563 F.3d 527, 532 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (noting that "special factors" would preclude
Bivens action for claims of torture brought by alien detainees on Guatinamo), cert. denied,
78 U.S.L.W. 3360 (U.S. Dec. 14, 2009) (No. 09-227).
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require the American Judiciary to assure them freedoms of
speech, press, and assembly as in the First Amendment, right to
bear arms as in the Second, security against "unreasonable"
searches and seizures as in the Fourth, as well as rights to jury
trial as in the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.2 6 8
Justice Jackson's concern addressed the extent to which all applica-
ble constitutional provisions should apply to a foreign territory that is
under U.S. occupation, and the absence of limiting principles. The
European Court of Human Rights stated this concern less inflammatorily
in Bankovie.2 69 The court felt it could not plausibly find "control" arising
from the air strikes if the implication was that all Convention rights would
have to be respected as a result. The Convention reflected an assumption
that states in the region shared common understandings of appropriate
rights and values; it was not intended to be a Convention for the world.270
Moreover, an occupying power is obligated to respect, to the extent possi-
ble, the local laws in the place of occupation. Both of these considera-
tions weighed against finding that the NATO countries exercised jurisdic-
tion in the former Yugoslavia.
Translated to the U.S. context, a number of these concerns are perti-
nent. While the application of the constitutional prohibition against
cruel and unusual punishment or conduct that shocks the conscience to
a detainee in U.S. custody abroad is entirely reasonable, 2 71 is it plausible
to apply the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement27 2 or the Fifth
Amendment prohibition on takings without just compensation? Is it ap-
propriate to obligate the United States to respect constitutional protec-
tions for freedom of speech and religion, or equal protection for the
rights of women, when occupying a country such as Iraq or Afghanistan
with radically different cultural and religious traditions?
At least three different considerations are at work here. The first
objection has to do with proportionality between the extent of control
exercised and the scope of legal obligations incurred. Does (or should) a
state's exercise of control over a person for certain limited purposes (e.g.,
detention and interrogation) nevertheless give rise to the full range of
268. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 784 (1949); see also United States v.
Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 273-74 (1990) (noting "significant and deleterious
consequences" that would follow from recognizing extraterritorial application of Fourth
Amendment).
269. Bankovit v. Belgium, 2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 333.
270. Id. at 356-57.
271. Cf. Exec. Order No. 13,491 § 3(a), 74 Fed. Reg. 4893, 4894 (Jan. 22, 2009)
(requiring humane treatment "whenever . .. individuals [detained in any armed conflict]
are in the custody or under the effective control of an officer, employee, or other agent of
the United States Government or detained within a facility owned, operated, or controlled
by a department or agency of the United States").
272. In re Terrorist Bombings of U.S. Embassies in E. Mr. (Fourth Amendment
Challenges), 552 F.3d 157, 159 (2d Cir. 2008) (holding Fourth Amendment




constitutional or treaty obligations? In Bankovie, the European Court sug-
gested yes in adopting a wholesale approach to Convention obligations
and was therefore reluctant to find jurisdiction. The more workable ap-
proach, and the majority international rule, however, has been a retail
approach, which recognizes jurisdiction, and therefore state obligations,
only in relation to the nature and scope of the control that is exercised.
In other words, it is the particular relationship between the territory or
person and the agents of the state that determines what rights are impli-
cated.2 73 Where state agents kidnap an individual abroad, only the rights
implicated by that conduct would be at issue. Assuming reasonable mar-
gins for the exercise of discretion, proportionality, and human error, as
are allowed under international humanitarian law, this concern is fre-
quently overstated. At the other extreme, where an occupation of a terri-
tory is not temporary, but indefinite, and where the state exercises com-
plete control over the region, as Israel does in the Occupied Territories,
recognizing applicability of the full range of a state's human rights obliga-
tions is appropriate. 274 The U.S. Supreme Court has drawn similar dis-
tinctions between territorial arrangements that are temporary (Cuba in
Neely) and permanent (GuantAnamo in Boumediene). The Supreme Court
also has long followed a retail approach to the application of the
Constitution abroad. At least since the Insular Cases, the relevant ques-
tion has been whether a particular constitutional provision is applicable
to a particular context abroad,275 and this approach was reaffirmed in
Boumediene.
273. See Adam Roberts, What Is a Military Occupation?, 1984 Brit. Y.B. Int'l L. 249,
304-05 ("[W]ithin the law on occupations there is some allowance for the application of
different combinations of rules in different circumstances.").
274. See Legal Consequences of Construction of Wall in Occupied Palestinian
Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, 197-98 (July 9); U.N. Human Rights Comm.,
Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant,
Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Comm.: Israel, I 11, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/
79/Add.93 (Aug. 18, 1998); see also U.N. Human Rights Comm., Israel 2003, supra note
122, 11.
275. See Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 292 (1901) (White, J., concurring) (noting
relevant question "is, not whether the Constitution is operative, for that is self-evident, but
whether the provision relied on is applicable"). Similarly, in his dissent in Johnson v.
Eisentrager, Justice Black noted:
If our country decides to occupy conquered territory either temporarily or
permanently, it assumes the problem of deciding how the subjugated people will
be ruled, what laws will govern, who will promulgate them, and what
governmental agency of ours will see that they are properly administered. This
responsibility immediately raises questions concerning the extent to which our
domestic laws, constitutional and statutory, are transplanted abroad. Probably no
one would suggest, and certainly I would not, that this nation either must or
should attempt to apply every constitutional provision of the Bill of Rights in
controlling temporarily occupied countries. But that does not mean that the
Constitution is wholly inapplicable in foreign territories that we occupy and
govern.
339 U.S. 763, 796-97 (1950) (citing Downes, 182 U.S. at 270-71).
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Another aspect of international law may also assist with determining
the legal obligations that should be applicable in any particular circum-
stance. Under international human rights law, a state is commonly un-
derstood to incur three tiers of legal obligations-the obligations to re-
spect, protect, and ensure rights. 27 6 The primary obligation, to respect,
obligates a state not to violate rights through its own conduct or the con-
duct of its agents. This obligation generally encompasses what liberal po-
litical theory describes as negative rights-the obligation that the state
must do no harm. The second tier, to protect, obligates the state to
shield individuals from harms committed by third parties, and includes
some obligations that would fall outside of state obligations under the
U.S. Constitution under the state action doctrine. The third tier, to en-
sure or fulfill rights, requires the state to secure the enjoyment of rights
that people are unable to secure themselves. Under U.S. constitutional
law, this would include obligations to ensure a republican form of govern-
ment or to establish fair court systems. The second and third tiers of
rights encompass what liberal theory portrays as positive rights or
obligations.
Part of the concern of the European Court of Human Rights in
Bankovie regarding the wholesale application of Convention rights re-
flected the scope of obligations embraced by these three tiers. The court
was concerned that an obligation not to arbitrarily deprive persons of life
in a NATO military campaign in Serbia (a primary obligation to respect)
should not also carry with it obligations, inter alia, to establish schools (a
tertiary obligation to ensure). Conceptualizing rights in terms of pri-
mary, secondary, and tertiary obligations offers one established way to
think about tailoring a state's legal obligations to the actual extent of
authority exercised.
The second concern raised by Justice Jackson's quotation-that cer-
tain legal protections are utterly inappropriate for situations of armed
conflict abroad-is to some extent a red herring. International humani-
tarian law establishes special international rules for states in wartime. Ad-
ditionally, constitutional provisions such as the Takings Clause have been
held by the Supreme Court, in light of international law, not to apply to
the unavoidable destruction of property in a wartime context. 7 The ap-
propriateness of applying certain rights in situations of armed conflict has
been confronted on the international plane in parsing the relationship
between international humanitarian law and human rights law. Similar
analyses can be pursued in the constitutional context.
The third objection is more compelling. It seems reasonable to as-
sume that there are certain contexts where application of particular con-
276. Asbjorn Eide, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights as Human Rights, in
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A Textbook 9, 23-25 (Asbjorn Eide et al. eds., 2d
ed. 2001) (discussing three tiers of obligations in context of economic, social, and cultural
rights).
277. See cases cited supra note 82.
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stitutional requirements to the behavior of government agents abroad
would either be unworkable for pragmatic reasons, or would be otherwise
inappropriate, such as where the Constitution requires an approach un-
known to the law of the territory being occupied. This was at least one of
the Court's considerations in the Insular Cases, in holding that Anglo-
American jury procedures were inappropriate for territories with civil law
traditions.
Both treaty and constitutional doctrines do exist, however, to address
such concerns. Where a treaty is being applied, flexible interpretation
through a margin of appreciation 278 or construction of a treaty's limita-
tions provisions may be adequate to address the problem. In more ex-
treme circumstances, the appropriate resolution may be to allow deroga-
tion from a particular treaty obligation. Narrowly employed, these tools
would build in flexibility in responding to particular circumstances, while
preserving a nation's fundamental, nonderogable obligations, including
the duty to protect life and to prevent and penalize acts of torture and
cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment.
In the context of U.S. constitutional law, Boumediene's functional,
pragmatic control test injects flexibility into the extraterritorial applica-
tion of the Constitution. The test also draws upon existing doctrine ex-
amining whether application of specific rights abroad would be "impracti-
cable and anomalous" in light of particular situations or cultural contexts.
Thus, in Reid v. Covert, Justice Harlan found that it was not "impracticable
and anomalous" to recognize constitutional grand and petit jury protec-
tions for U.S. civilians tried by the U.S. military overseas.2 79 In Verdugo,
Justice Kennedy reasoned in concurrence that applying the Fourth
Amendment's warrant requirement to the search of an alien's property in
Mexico was "impracticable and anomalous," since no U.S. court was avail-
able at the time to issue search warrants in another country, and because
residents in other countries may have different expectations of privacy. 28 0
There were flaws injustice Kennedy's reasoning, since he suggested that
the Fourth Amendment should apply to the search of a U.S. citizen's
property abroad, even though the "impracticability" of obtaining a war-
rant would have been the same. Kennedy also failed to consider whether
the "reasonableness" requirement of the Fourth Amendment should ap-
ply to an extraterritorial search, irrespective of the warrant requirement.
278. See R. St. J. Macdonald, The Margin of Appreciation, in The European System
for the Protection of Human Rights 83 (R. St. J. MacDonald et al. eds., 1993) (noting
doctrine of margin of appreciation in European Court of Human Rights case law seeks to
"develop a reasonably comprehensive set of review principles appropriate for application
across the entire [European] Convention, while at the same time recognizing the diversity
of political, economic, cultural and social situations in" European States).
279. 354 U.S. 1, 74 (1957) (Harlan, J., concurring in the result).




These infirmities notwithstanding, if rigorously applied, the "imprac-
ticable and anomalous" approach suggests that some flexibility might re-
main where it actually was unworkable to apply constitutional protections
in a particular context. But as with treaty limitations and derogations,
constitutional protections for fundamental protection of life and bodily
security should always be "practicable" to apply to persons in U.S.
custody.
Likewise, the Supreme Court developed a doctrine regarding "fun-
damental" rights in incorporating constitutional rights against the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment,28 1 as well as in the Insular Cases for
determining what constitutional rights should be respected in unincorpo-
rated U.S. territories. These related doctrines require consideration of
the extent to which a particular constitutional provision, or a particular
aspect of constitutional doctrine (such as the requirement of twelve-mem-
ber juries, unanimous verdicts, or search warrants) is fundamental to the
constitutional system, or instead is a culturally contingent procedural re-
quirement. In answering this question, the Court at times has looked to
what practices are considered fundamental not only under Anglo-
American law but also in the laws of civilized nations. 28 2 Moreover, in
determining what constitutional doctrines should apply to overseas terri-
tories, lower courts have interpreted the fundamental rights doctrine as
an inquiry into whether rights are "fundamental in the international
sense."28 3 In answering this question, they have looked explicitly to inter-
national law and foreign practice to determine the appropriateness of
applying any particular provision extraterritorially.
Consistent with international law approaches to this question, both
the "fundamental" rights and "impracticable and anomalous" doctrines
suggest that certain constitutional requirements might not apply, or
might not apply in the same way, in an occupied territory where respect
for local cultural and religious traditions was appropriate. In applying
the Equal Protection Clause to overseas U.S. territories, for example, the
281. See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 53 (1947) ("The due process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment . . . does not draw all the rights of the federal Bill of Rights
under its protection."), overruled in part by Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964); Palko v.
Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1937) (noting right to trial by jury is "not of the very
essence of a scheme of ordered liberty," and "[t]o abolish them is not to violate a principle
of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as
fundamental" (internal quotation marks omitted)), overruled by Benton v. Maryland, 395
U.S. 784 (1969); Burnett, supra note 265, at 1026-31 (noting relevance of Fourteenth
Amendment incorporation analysis to fundamental rights approach to extraterritorial
application of the Constitution).
282. Palko, 302 U.S. at 326 n.3 ("Double jeopardy .. . is not everywhere forbidden.");
Twining v. NewJersey, 211 U.S. 78, 110-11 (1908) (observing that jurisdiction and notice
were the "two fundamental conditions [of due process], which seem to be universally
prescribed in all systems of law established by civilized countries").
283. See Wabol v. Villacrusis, 958 F.2d 1450, 1462 (9th Cir. 1992) (finding statute
immune to equal protection attack because the particular aspect of equality at issue was
not "fundamental in the international sense").
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federal courts have upheld legal preferences for the local population that
would not be allowed in the mainland United States. The modern courts
have done so out of a desire to accommodate cultural differences and
self-determination among territorial inhabitants.284 Some type of margin
of appreciation therefore could be applied in such cases. 285
Much remains to be fleshed out regarding the potential impact of an
evolutionary relationship between extraterritoriality and the modern ju-
risdictional conception of effective control. But under Boumediene's func-
tional approach, and consistent with an evolutionary approach to interna-
tional principles of jurisdiction, international law and practice should be
relevant to identifying what constitutional protections must be respected
abroad. To some extent, this is a choice of law question, and where the
question involves whether the U.S. Constitution obligates the government
to take some form of action that could conflict with the law of another
jurisdiction, established limitations on the exercise of international juris-
diction, including the principle of reasonableness, 28 6 could provide gui-
dance regarding when application of domestic law is appropriate. Where
the question is whether constitutional limitations should constrain the
government where it has already chosen to act abroad, the decisions of
international and regional courts and tribunals, and the approaches of
other national legal systems to questions of extraterritoriality, could pro-
vide guidance on whether or not application of a particular constitutional
protection must be respected.
CONCLUSION
Global legal obligations are becoming increasingly complex, with
overlapping legal authority frequently exercised by international, re-
gional, national, subnational, and nonstate actors. The multifaceted
character of legal authority is posing many complex challenges for global
governance, of which determining the obligations that flow from extra-
territorial state conduct is only a small part. The world has long since
abandoned a regime in which rigid territorial rules could meaningfully
define and separate the legal obligations of states, and Boumediene an-
284. See, e.g., Wabol, 958 F.2d at 1460-61 (upholding race-based restriction on land
sales intended to protect traditional culture); Rayphand v. Sablan, 95 F. Supp. 2d 1133,
1139-40 (D. N. Mar. I. 1999) (holding "one person, one vote" standard is not "the basis of
all free government" and therefore "need not be applied in and to an unincorporated
territory such as the Commonwealth" of the Northern Mariana Islands), affd, Torres v.
Sablan, 528 U.S. 1110 (2000); Banks v. Am. Samoa Gov't, 4 Am. Samoa 2d 113, 125 (1987)
(upholding race-based employment preferences for American Samoans where application
of equal protection principles "would tend to be destructive of the traditional culture"); cf.
Gerald L. Neuman, Anomalous Zones, 48 Stan. L. Rev. 1197, 1197, 1202-03 (1996)
(discussing significance of local preferences in determining whether government should
"suspend fundamental norms within a territorially limited enclave").
285. See supra note 278 and accompanying text.
286. Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 403
(1987) (identifying reasonableness limitations on exercise of jurisdiction).
286 [Vol. 110:225
EMBEDDED IN\TERNATIONAL LAW
nounced that the effort to preserve this approach with respect to the ex-
traterritorial rights of aliens had proven unsustainable. By reopening a
space for considering modern international principles of jurisdiction,
Boumediene dragged U.S. approaches to extraterritoriality out of the 1800s
and simultaneously ended a long-festering form of American exceptional-
ism. Much work remains to be done in elaborating both the Boumediene
effective control tests and applying them to particular constitutional pro-
visions and contexts. The challenges facing U.S. extraterritoriality doc-
trine, as well as international law principles of effective control, will be
particularly complex in situations where a state does not act alone, but
acts in concert with one or more other states, or as part of a multilateral
effort, as the developing international case law suggests.
These challenges will become more acute as transnational interac-
tion increases with growing collaboration on international trade, law en-
forcement, and security efforts. In the security context alone, the past
few years have seen U.N. obligations to place individuals on terrorism
watch lists conflict with national or regional obligations to respect basic
due process rights,2 8 7 the establishment of secret U.S. prisons and refuel-
ing of U.S. rendition planes on foreign soil, and the secret transfer of
terrorism suspects to other countries for purposes of interrogation and
torture.28 8 In these and other circumstances, effective control may, as a
practical matter, be possessed by multiple actors, and workable interna-
tional and constitutional doctrines for establishing accountability will
need to be flexible and sensitive to practical realities.
As challenging as the road ahead may be, Boumediene and Munaf of-
fer an important first step toward reconciling U.S. constitutional doctrine
with this multifaceted global reality. By moving from entrenchment to-
ward an evolutionary approach and opening U.S. constitutional princi-
ples of legal accountability to modern international standards, Boumediene
also eliminates a number of doctrinal anomalies in U.S. law. It reduces
the differential treatment of citizens and aliens when they are subject to
U.S. authority abroad. It erodes the possibility of extraterritorial constitu-
tional lacunae. The Court's evolutionary approach also has the potential
to align U.S. domestic law with the expectations and legal obligations of
our major allies, with U.S. legal duties under international law, and with
the modern realities of the global exercise of U.S. power.
287. Joined Cases C402/05 P & C-415/05 P, Kadi v. Council, 2008 ECJ EUR-Lex
LEXIS 1954, at *140, *146 (Sept. 3, 2008) (holding members of European Community
have obligation to ensure actions taken to fulfill U.N. Security Council resolution do not
violate European Community rights and finding that Security Council listing process does
not provide for adequate judicial review or property right protections); see also Yearbook
of European Law 2009 (Piet Eeckhout & Takis Tridimas, eds., forthcoming May 2010)
(Symposium on Kadi Judgment).
288. E.g., Arar v. Ashcroft, 532 F.3d 157, 175-76 (2d Cir. 2008) (alleging secret
rendition to Syria for torture), aff'd on other grounds on reh'g en banc, 585 F.3d 559 (2d
Cir. 2009).
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